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ENDING THE HIGHER EDUCATION SUCKER SALE:
TOWARD AN EXPANDED THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY
FOR RECRUITMENT DECEPTION
Aaron N. Taylor
Abstract
Admissions officers live a dual, often conflicted, existence. In one
sense, they are counselors responsible for advising prospective students.
In another sense, they are salespeople with obligations to meet enrollment
goals. The pressures fostered by these roles sometimes prompt
unscrupulous individuals to use misrepresentations and other forms of
deception to induce students to enroll. Unfortunately, students who are
induced to enroll based on recruitment deception are afforded few options
for redress. The purpose of this Article is to conceptualize a tort-based
solution to this utter inequity. The Article proposes a broadening of
negligent misrepresentation to encompass a new tort—negligent
educational recruitment. This tort would employ approaches to
determining duty and causation that account for the distinctive nature of
the educational process, and, thus, overcome the concerns that often doom
negligent misrepresentation lawsuits in the higher education context.
I. INTRODUCTION
The used car salesman is held out to be the ultimate swindler. He has been
stylized as a polyester-clad, cigar-chomping figure, with a shifty manner of speech
and a gaudy approach to accessorizing. In popular parlance, the addition of “like a
used car salesman” can turn an innocuous subject-verb statement into an insult. Next
to politicians and lawyers, there is likely no more popular target of half-witted jokes
and generalized scorn than the peddlers of preowned vehicles.
The very nature of the car selling business nurtures these unflattering
perceptions. The commission-based pay structure provides clear incentives for
advantage taking and outright dishonesty by sellers. Salespeople are trained to use
tactics premised on tipping the negotiation (to the extent that there is one) and any
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eventual sale in their favor. Buyers often approach the sale with little information
and no training or experience in negotiating. The most successful salespeople are
those who are able to extract the best deal by compounding their tactical strengths
with the buyer’s weaknesses.
The potential for a sucker sale is particularly acute on car lots, where sale prices
and finance terms are subject to manipulation and product defects are easily hidden.
The untrained and uninformed buyer is little match for the astute seller whose
paycheck depends on closing the deal. As a result, and for good reason, buyers tend
to be suspicious of car salespeople, and it is plausible that in some cases that
suspicion yields a better deal for the buyer. But imagine a setting where sellers have
all the advantages afforded their peers in the car business, but they also enjoy an
advantage of which most car salespeople could only dream—the buyer’s trust.
Colleges and universities provide such settings, and admissions officers all too often
take advantage by using deception to induce students to enroll.
Unfortunately, students who are induced to enroll based on deception are
afforded few options for redress. The fundamental relationship between a student
and her higher education institution is contractual in nature; therefore, victims of
recruitment deception often bring breach of contract claims.1 But in order to be
successful, a plaintiff’s allegations must pertain to specific unfulfilled promises.2 An
assurance made to a prospective student that she would have “no problem” finding
a job with a particular degree lacks the specificity needed to be actionable in a breach
of contract suit, even though it could serve as a functional promise.
Victims of recruitment deception often bring tort claims as well. Fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and educational malpractice are
common tort theories. Unfortunately, none of these claims provide a viable path for
students victimized by slick higher education sales tactics. Fraudulent
misrepresentation requires a showing of scienter, or intent to deceive, which is
difficult to prove.3 In addition, allegations of fraud must be alleged with a level of
specificity that is often difficult to present.4 Negligence claims, including
misrepresentation and malpractice, tend to fail because courts have found it
“extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible,” to determine educational duty.5

1

E.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 417.
3
E.g., Hunter v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 439 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. 1982)
(“[C]laimant will usually face a formidable burden in attempting to produce adequate
evidence to establish the intent requirement of the tort . . . .”).
4
E.g., Jamieson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctr., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (D. Kan.
2007) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, an allegation of fraud must ‘set forth the time, place,
and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements
and the consequences thereof.’” (quoting Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d
1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997))).
5
E.g., Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Iowa 2001).
2
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Courts have also fashioned a host of “policy” justifications for dismissing
educational malpractice claims.6
The end result is that admissions officers are allowed to make deliberate and
convincing misrepresentations with virtual impunity. Applicants, many of whom
lack higher education insight and are unaware that their supposed admissions
counselor is actually a salesperson, are left to be victimized, with insult added by the
lack of redress for their injuries.
The purpose of this Article is to conceptualize a tort-based solution to this utter
inequity. The Article proposes a broadening of negligent misrepresentation to
encompass a new tort—negligent educational recruitment. This tort would employ
approaches to determining duty and causation that account for the distinctive nature
of the educational process, and, thus, conceivably overcome the concerns that often
doom negligence lawsuits.
A tort-based solution is needed because contractual liability is determined
based on assumptions that are sometimes unsuitable for application to the higher
education context. Contract law assumes arms-length transactions.7 In the context of
higher education, however, information asymmetries place admissions officers and
prospective students on unequal footing, allowing the former to exercise undue
influence upon the latter.8 Contract law also assumes morally indifferent parties.9
But our enduring (though increasingly skeptical) societal encouragement of
educational pursuits is based on a value-laden “public good” premise.10 Recognizing

6

An education malpractice claim in this context could encompass allegations that the
education received by a student was of lower quality than what was promised by an
admissions officer. In addition to the professed absence of a duty of care, courts have cited
uncertainty in determining causation and damages, the potential flood of litigation burdening
schools, and the judicial deference historically afforded educational institutions. E.g., id.
7
See Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1985) (“In contract
the parties voluntarily assume duties and allocate risks.”).
8
U.S. SENATE, HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., FOR PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE
STUDENT SUCCESS 43–67 (2012) [hereinafter HELP REPORT], available at
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/76FA-34EW (providing extensive documentation of
various unscrupulous tactics used by for-profit admissions officers in inducing enrollment);
David D. Dill, Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 HIGHER EDUC.
Q. 136, 147 (2003) (“[B]ecause higher education in the US is an industry in which consumers
cannot objectively evaluate the quality of the service before they purchase it, an information
asymmetry can exist in which institutions may take advantage of consumers.”).
9
Cohen, supra note 7, at 1313 (“Contract law presumes that parties are indifferent
between performance or breach, that breach is morally neutral, and that expectation damages
are adequate to make the injured party whole.”).
10
WALTER W. MCMAHON, TIAA-CREF INST., THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE EVIDENCE, THEIR VALUE, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2010),
available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/
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the shortcomings of contract law, the tort theory conceptualized in this Article
acknowledges both the special relationship between admissions officers and
prospective students and the need for strong deterrents that transcend the limits of
contract law.
The discussion will be illustrated with a primary focus on for-profit higher
education. This orientation is not meant to suggest that the not-for-profit sector is
free of improprieties. Schools in all sectors of higher education face similar pressures
to generate income through student enrollments, and allegations of unscrupulous
practices transcend sectors.11 But as a general proposition, the pressure to increase
enrollments is greater among for-profit schools due to their profit motive and the
absence of alternative sources of revenue, such as public appropriations and
endowments.12 As a result, for-profit schools have been targets of a disproportionate
number of allegations of unscrupulous recruitment behavior, especially allegations
of unlawful compensation arrangements for admissions officers.13 The distinctive

documents/document/tiaa02029326.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MU7Q-G9HQ
(“Beyond the private benefits . . . of higher education[,] . . . [t]here are contributions to
democratic institutions, human rights, political stability, lower state welfare costs, lower
health costs, lower public incarceration costs, contributions to social capital, to the generation
of new ideas, and so forth.”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(“[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities . . . . It
is the very foundation of good citizenship.”).
11
In recent years, various colleges and universities have admitted to inflating entering
student credentials in order to increase rankings and make their classes appear more
competitive. E.g., Beckie Supiano, Emory U. Intentionally Misreported Admissions Data,
Investigation Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://chronicle.com/blogs/
headcount/emory-u-intentionally-misreported-admissions-data-investigation-finds/31215,
archived at http://perma.cc/U4WE-BM52. Additionally, law schools have been the target of
a series of lawsuits alleging, among other things, misrepresentation of outcomes data. E.g.,
Paul Barrett, Glut Leads Lawyers to (Surprise) Sue Law Schools, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar.
23,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-23/glut-leads-lawyers-tosurprise-sue-law-schools, archived at http://perma.cc/62XD-5U42.
12
Associate’s and certificate level for-profit schools receive 89% of their total revenue
from tuition and fees, compared to 16% for public and 58% for private institutions. At the
bachelor’s degree level, 91% of for-profit revenue comes from tuition and fees, compared to
19% among public and 33% among private institutions. SUSAN AUD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, at 102–03
(2012),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/CCJ2-CPDH; HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 49 (“The pressure to recruit as
many students as possible starts at the top of the for-profit education business model.
Investors . . . demand revenue growth. Revenue growth requires enrolling a steady stream of
students.”).
13
For-profit entities were the target of forty-two of the forty-five most recent federal
False Claims Act lawsuits filed against education entities. GIBSON DUNN, LIST OF QUI TAM
EDUCATIONAL CASES (2013), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/QuiTamEducationalCases.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NRQ4-U8MA
(providing a list of cases).
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aspects of the sector and the vibrancy of the critical attention it attracts make it
particularly amenable to illustrative focus.
In making the case for a tort path to redress for victims of recruitment
deception, the Article will begin, in Part II, with a discussion of how conflicting
roles can prompt admissions officers to engage in deceptive behavior. Part III
describes the market in which higher education institutions operate and the role of
marketing and recruitment. Part IV focuses on for-profit school marketing and
recruitment practices. Part V explains the limited paths to redress afforded victims
of recruitment deception. Part VI presents the negligent educational recruitment
theory. Part VII concludes.
II. CONFLICTING ROLES OF ADMISSIONS OFFICERS
The business of higher education ensures that admissions officers live a dual,
often conflicted, existence. In one sense, they are counselors responsible for advising
prospective students. In another sense, they are salespeople with obligations to meet
institutional and individual enrollment goals. The roles are understandable. The
admissions office is often the first point of contact for the public, particularly
prospective students. Therefore, admissions officers serve as critical sources of
information and guidance. The admissions office is also a major, if not principal,
revenue center. When prospective students become actual students, they also
become sources of revenue.14 Schools need students in order to survive and thrive,
financially and otherwise. And it is the admissions office that fosters the process of
renewal that takes place at the beginning of each enrollment period.
A review of recent admissions job announcements illustrates this duality. For
example, Florida Southern College, a Methodist Church affiliated institution15 that
sits on a picturesque campus16 designed by renowned architect Frank Lloyd
Wright,17 posted an announcement for an admissions counselor.18 The first sentence
14

SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATES, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2004) (discussing how, upon
enrollment, students become sources of funds, in addition to university services and
trademarked goods).
15
About FSC, History, FLA. S. COLL., http://www.flsouthern.edu/about.aspx, archived
at http://perma.cc/S5NZ-XCDH (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).
16
Florida Southern College is the “Most Beautiful Campus” for the Second Year in a
Row, FLA. S. COLL., http://archive-edu.com/page/1144011/2013-01-14/http://www.flsouth
ern.edu/news.asp?ACTION=view&ID=1038, archived at http://perma.cc/7X3W-YVEP
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (“For an unprecedented second consecutive year, Florida Southern
College has been named the No. 1 Most Beautiful Campus in America by the prestigious
Princeton Review.”).
17
Welcome!, FLA. S. COLL., http://www.flsouthern.edu/fllw-visitors.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/3TMB-GE7S (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (highlighting that Florida Southern
College is the only college campus in the world designed by Wright).
18
Admissions Counselor, HIGHEREDJOBS, http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details
.cfm?JobCode=175732749&Title=Admissions%20Counselor, archived at http://perma.cc/
V7Q6-SU3R (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) [hereinafter FSC Admissions Counselor Position].
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of the announcement states that the incumbent is “responsible for meeting or
exceeding the freshman recruitment goal.”19 While recruitment goals can pertain to
different objectives, including student credentials and demographics, these goals
commonly center on sheer numbers of students enrolled.20 So, immediately, the
announcement makes clear that job responsibilities and therefore job performance
is premised on getting the proverbial “asses in classes.”21 But the announcement also
highlights the incumbent’s counseling responsibilities—specifically, articulating
“the mission and values of the College” and advising “prospective students and their
parents through all phases of the admissions and financial aid processes.”22 In one
role, the admissions officer has a personal interest in successfully inducing prospects
to enroll. But in her other role, she must serve the interests of these same prospects
by communicating accurate, honest, and helpful information.
Becker College, a private not-for-profit institution that caters to nontraditional
students (as well as a traditional-aged population) also recently sought an admissions
counselor. The announcement initially highlights the position’s counseling
responsibilities, specifically, “pre-admission advising.”23 But the tone of the
announcement shifts quickly to the sales responsibilities. The incumbent would be
responsible for telemarketing and managing corporate relationships, with the goal
of increasing enrollment.24 Unsurprisingly, experience in lead generation, sales, or
marketing is desired.25
In the for-profit higher education sector, where ever-growing enrollment is
central to profitability, the sales role tends to take prominence over the counseling
role. A recent announcement seeking “goal-oriented” admissions recruiters at The
Art Institute of York—Pennsylvania highlights this prominence.26 The goal
orientation is made clear when the announcement expresses a desire for applicants
with experience selling timeshares, insurance, financial services, and,
unsurprisingly, automobiles.27 While the announcement mentions that recruiters
guide prospective students through the admissions and enrollment processes, the
19

Id.
See HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 4, 46–49.
21
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT PRCN 200340922254 UNIVERSITY
OF PHOENIX, OPEID 020988 00 SITE VISIT OF 8/18/2003–8/22/2003, at 10 (2004)
[hereinafter UOP PROGRAM REVIEW REPORT], available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/pro
publica/assets/higher-ed/doe_report_uop.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/448M-VAZJ
(identifying “asses in classes” and “butts in seats” as the premises underlying University of
Phoenix’s recruiter compensation plans).
22
FSC Admissions Counselor Position, supra note 18.
23
Admissions Counselor, HIGHEREDJOBS, http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details
.cfm?JobCode=175732689&Title=Admissions%20Counselor, archived at http://perma.cc/E
6UU-BBJX (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
24
Id.
25
See id.
26
Admissions Recruiter, HIGHEREDJOBS, http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details
.cfm?JobCode=175731650&Title=Admissions%20Recruiter, archived at http:/perma.cc/4
GBV-PBBA (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
27
Id.
20
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tone of the announcement strongly suggests that this guidance is another form of
selling—akin to a used car salesman “counseling” a customer into the “right” car.28
Conflation of the sales and counseling roles is dangerous, especially in the
higher education setting. As highlighted earlier, while most people are suspicious of
a used car salesman’s counsel, most are willing to trust the guidance offered by an
admissions officer. This leaves the targets of recruitment deception in a defenseless
mindset and, therefore, ripe for a sucker sale. The risks are illustrated in a lawsuit
against The Art Institute of York—Pennsylvania, its peer institutions, and its parent
company, Education Management Corporation (EDMC).
A. United States v. Education Management Corp.
The suit, United States v. Education Management Corp.,29 was originally filed
in 2007 by two former EDMC employees who alleged that EDMC and its
subsidiaries operated unlawful compensation schemes where admissions officers
were paid based on the number of students they induced to enroll.30 The suit was
brought pursuant to the federal False Claims Act,31 which allows private individuals
with personal knowledge of fraud against the federal government to bring suit
against alleged defrauders in the name of the government and share in any
recovery.32 The bases of the alleged fraud were various certifications that EDMC
submitted to the Department of Education (ED) declaring their compliance with
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, including the ban on incentive
compensation for admissions officers.33 These certifications are required in order for
28

See id.
871 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
30
In 1992, Congress banned the use of incentive compensation for recruiters “based on
its concern that schools were creating incentives for recruiters to enroll students who could
not graduate or could not find employment after graduating.” Ass’n of Private Sector Colls.
& Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In 2002, twelve “safe harbors” or
exceptions to the ban were enacted. Id. at 437–38. These exceptions, however, were
eliminated from the regulations in 2010 based on a determination by the Department of
Education (ED) that “‘unscrupulous’ institutions used the safe harbor for salary adjustments
to ‘circumvent the intent’ of the Higher Education Act (HEA) and to avoid detection and
sanction for engaging in unlawful compensation practices.” Id. at 445. The relevant facts in
this case occurred while the safe harbors were still in effect.
31
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
32
Through the Act, violators are liable for civil penalties between $5,500 and $11,000
for each false claim and triple the amount of actual damages to the government. Relators (the
persons who initiate the action) are entitled to receive 15% to 30% of the amount recovered.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_
Primer.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MU99-YDN9.
33
Joint Complaint in Intervention by The United States of America, and the States of
California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana at 22, U.S. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d
433 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (Civil Action No. 07-461) [hereinafter Joint Complaint] (“EDMC
knowingly made false statements, certifications, and claims regarding compliance with the
29
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institutions to become, and remain, eligible to collect federal student aid funds.34 In
2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) intervened in the case (an uncommon
occurrence that was likely a sign that the allegations appear provable35) along with
several states that disbursed student aid in reliance on similar certifications.36 In
total, the lawsuit alleges that EDMC fraudulently received more than $11 billion in
federal funds37 and more than $138 million from the intervening states.38
Within EDMC-owned schools, the lawsuit describes a “boiler room” sales
culture in which recruiting and enrolling new students was the “relentless and
exclusive focus.”39 Unlawful compensation schemes, where an admissions officer’s
pay and advancement hinged on the numbers of students he induced to enroll, were
the alleged outgrowth of this culture.40 Admissions officers were required to approve
students, irrespective of their qualifications or life circumstances.41 For example,
applicants without personal computers were allegedly recruited for online
programs.42
Admission officers were also trained in high-pressure sales techniques. They
were encouraged to identify and exploit an applicant’s vulnerabilities—a technique
known as “finding the pain.”43 The “pain” often took the form of a deep-seated,
unattained goal.44 So if an applicant expressed a desire for a better life, admissions
officers were instructed to use this goal as a means of inducing the applicant to
enroll, even if enrollment would offer little prospect of achieving the goal (or

Incentive Compensation Ban in order to become and remain eligible to receive Title IV
funding.”); see also id. at 52 (“Every request for a federal grant, every request for a [federal
student] loan, . . . every interest payment on a subsidized Stafford Loan, and every
government payment on a [student] loan . . . constitutes a separate false claim.”).
34
Initial eligibility requires an institution to enter into a program participation
agreement with the ED; subsequent eligibility requires institutions to submit annual required
management assertions. Id. at 15–17 (discussing program participation agreement and
required management assertions).
35
DOJ has intervened in seven of the forty-five most recent federal False Claims Act
lawsuits filed against education entities. GIBSON DUNN, supra note 13. Settlements were
reached in four of the cases; the other three are pending. Id.
36
The intervening states were California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana. Joint
Complaint, supra note 33, at 4–7, 9–12.
37
Id. at 24.
38
The following are the amounts the intervening states are alleging EDMC received
through fraudulent means: California, $93 million; Illinois, $27.5 million; Indiana, $12.3
million; and Florida, $5.2 million. See id. at 56, 66, 83, 85–106.
39
Id. at 27.
40
Id.; see also id. at 27–28 (providing overview of alleged compensation arrangement).
41
Id. at 32. According to the lawsuit, admissions officers were instructed to enroll
students even if they lacked basic skills, such as the ability to write, or even if they seemed
to be under the influence of drugs. Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 33.
44
See id.
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alleviating the “pain”).45 The objective was to overcome an applicant’s reluctance
or skepticism by appealing to his emotions—and, if necessary, by offering
deception.46 The pressure applied by admissions officers onto prospects47 reflected
the top-down pressure to increase enrollments.48 The incentives built into their
compensation structure, even if legal, rendered EDMC admissions officers nothing
more than salespeople masquerading as counselors—proverbial wolves in sheep’s
clothing.
III. THE HIGHER EDUCATION MARKET
The aftermath of World War II saw the creation of a favorable market for higher
education in the United States. The GI Bill,49 passed in 1944, prompted an
unprecedented influx of students into the nation’s colleges and universities.50
Lawmakers were concerned about the prospect of millions of returning veterans
flooding the job market.51 So incentives were created for veterans to undertake
higher education instead of potentially damaging the fragile post-Depression
recovery. When the original bill ended in 1956, almost eight million veterans had
taken advantage of its higher education benefits, and at its peak in 1947, veterans
45

Id.
See id. at 32–33; HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (“Recruiters are encouraged to
search for and exploit potential students’ emotional vulnerabilities by finding a ‘pain point’
. . . .”).
47
Joint Complaint, supra note 33, at 33–34 (alleging that admissions officers were
expected to engage in various high pressure tactics in order to ensure that applicants
completed their enrollment).
48
Id. at 41–44 (quoting emails sent to admissions officers from their supervisors
stressing the importance of hitting enrollment targets).
49
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill of Rights), ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284
(1944) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 3701 (2012)). Through the GI Bill, veterans who
served more than ninety days were granted education benefits, including tuition grants and
stipends. The tuition grants were generous enough to cover expenses at some of the most
expensive schools. The stipends are estimated to have covered 50–70% of the opportunity
costs of not working. See, e.g., John Bound & Sarah Turner, Going to War and Going to
College: Did World War II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning
Veterans? 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7452, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7452.pdf?new_window=1, archived at http://perma.cc/YT5Y
-AW4Y. But see IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 114 (2005) (discussing
the discriminatory nature in which GI Bill benefits were distributed).
50
History and Timeline, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.gibill.va.gov/
benefits/history_timeline/, archived at http://perma.cc/99U2-C4MK (last visited Sept. 7,
2014) [hereinafter The GI Bill’s History] (characterizing higher education as an “unreachable
dream[] for the average American” prior to the GI Bill).
51
ROBERT ZEMSKY ET AL., REMAKING THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: MARKET-SMART
AND MISSION-CENTERED 190 (2005) (“The original impetus for giving veterans tuition
benefits was to keep them out of the labor market at least for a while.”).
46
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accounted for half of the admissions applications submitted to colleges and
universities.52
The GI Bill, while a boon for institutions,53 set the stage for the competitive
market pressures that we see today. Unlike other federal investments in higher
education, which provided aid directly to institutions, GI Bill aid was provided
directly to the student.54 This novel approach allowed beneficiaries to ostensibly
vote with their feet, and take their aid with them. The GI Bill’s approach to student
aid served as a blueprint for the wholesale transition to “mobile” aid that took place
in 1972. That year, Congress amended the Higher Education Act (HEA) to award
federal grants and loans directly to students, preparing the seedbed from which the
student-consumer mindset would sprout.55
A. In Search of Tangibility
The rising cost of higher education,56 along with an increasing belief that higher
education was a private “economic necessity,”57 solidified the student-consumer
mindset. This transition presented a new challenge for institutions—how to frame
themselves to a population increasingly perceiving education as a consumable
product. Colleges and universities are part of the “trust economy” because buyers
have to trust that they will get the “product” for which they are paying.58 Building
this trust requires tangibility; but education itself is intangible.59 Schools, however,

52

The GI Bill’s History, supra note 50.
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 190 (asserting that the influx of veterans helped
“restart” many colleges and universities whose programs had been reduced during the war).
54
See, e.g., Martin Trow, Federalism in American Higher Education, in HIGHER
LEARNING IN AMERICA 1980-2000, at 39, 58–59 (Arthur Levine ed., 1993).
55
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 35.
56
See id. at 283 (explaining the state-level shift from providing subsidies to institutions
to requiring students to foot a larger portion of their costs of attendance); ZEMSKY ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 166 (describing the increasing prominence of students loans and the “truly
awesome levels of personal indebtedness” students were incurring in order to fund their
higher education).
57
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 11 (“During the last fifty years a college education
has come to be perceived as an economic necessity pursued by the many, rather than a
privilege reserved for the few.”); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S.,
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCING COLLEGE EDUCATION 4 (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4984/01-23education.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S283-TNPU (concluding that the financial payoff
of higher education has engendered an investment mindset among students).
58
ERIC J. ANCTIL, SELLING HIGHER EDUCATION: MARKETING AND ADVERTISING
AMERICA’S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 9 (2008) (citing Gordon C. Winston, Subsidies,
Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 13,
14–15 (1999)).
59
Id. at 6 (“Much of what is ‘for sale’ in higher education are the intangibles such as
learning and lived experiences.”).
53
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have traditionally sought to create tangibility by highlighting factors such as
academic quality, buildings and amenities, and athletics.60
Academics are often touted using favorable showings on ranking lists compiled
by outside entities, such as U.S. News and World Report.61 In spite of their dubious
value,62 these lists are popular with students and parents because they ostensibly add
a degree of simplicity to the complicated process of measuring and comparing
academic quality. Put differently, they “[fuse] education with consumption” by
suggesting that one educational product is superior (or inferior) to another,63 akin to
a Consumer Reports review of washing machines.
The buildings dotting a school’s campus and the amenities offered can make or
break a student’s enrollment decision.64 In fact, for some students, amenities are
more important than perceived academic quality.65 This reality has fueled physical
expansion and a marketing emphasis on things such as plush dormitories,66 lavish

60

Id. at 53.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 23.
62
See, e.g., Bill Destler, The Ultimate Absurdity of College Rankings, HUFFPOST (May
5, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-destler/the-ultimate-absurdityof_b_3247841.html?utm_hp_ref=tw, archived at http://perma.cc/CU4P-XVX4.
63
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 23.
64
See Brian Jacob et al., College as Country Club: Do Colleges Cater to Students’
Preferences for Consumption?, 29 (Jan. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.freakonomics.com/media/CollegeConsumptionJan2013.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/C7R-ZTYB (“We have documented a substantial enrollment response to
spending on student services and auxiliary enterprises, which we interpret as reflective of the
importance of consumption considerations in students’ decisions.”).
65
See id. at 37 (“Less selective schools (particularly privates) . . . have a greater
incentive to focus on consumption amenities, since this is what their marginal students
value.”).
66
For example, Princeton describes its palatial and much ballyhooed Whitman College
dormitory as follows:
61

Walls of hand-set stone rise from 20 feet to as high as 100 feet to make up
the complex of residential, social and academic buildings that sweep upward
above terraced courtyards. Bluestone walkways criss-cross at the feet of dorms
and communal buildings, which include a large gabled dining hall and a great
tower that announces the entry into the college near the south end of Princeton's
campus.
Cass Cliatt, Princeton’s Whitman College Marks Revival of Traditional Architecture (Sept.
24, 2007, 5:00 PM), http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S19/04/10O93/?section
=featured, archived at http://perma.cc/4JV4-6XTQ.
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student centers,67 and restaurant quality meal options.68 Similar to the lists
purporting to measure academic quality, lists assessing things like “The 25 Most
Amazing Campus Student Recreation Centers” have a pervasive presence online.69
Athletics can provide another measure of perceived tangibility to a higher
education product.70 A winning sports team can have a “halo effect” upon every
aspect of the institution (e.g., If the football team is this good, the engineering
program must be good too.).71 Therefore, many schools spend inordinate amounts
of money, running significant deficits,72 attempting to build winning athletic
programs that will rally their fans and thrust their school onto national television and
atop the major polls (i.e., athletic rankings).73
The 1990s brought another form of tangibility: outcomes. Higher education was
caught up in what has been described as “the third wave of accountability.”74 The
first two waves took place the decade before and focused on corporate America75
67

The University of Missouri boasts that students “won’t find a better facility in the
world than what we’ve got right here at Mizzou.” MizzouRec Services and Facilities,
LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/mizzourec, archived at http://perma.cc/JPV
6-8QAG (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). With a rock wall, a grotto, and a “beach club” (which
has been described as an indoor beach), the boasting is probably warranted. MizzouRec:
Facilities, MIZZOUREC, http://www.mizzourec.com/facilities/, archived at http://perma.cc/
K3H3-H3RJ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
68
High Point University runs a steakhouse, 1924 PRIME, where students can purchase
meals through the university’s meal plan. 1924 Prime, HIGHPOINT U.,
http://1924prime.highpoint.edu/, archived at http://perma.cc/9BQU-Z24K (last visited Sept.
7, 2014).
69
See, e.g., The 25 Most Amazing Campus Student Recreation Centers, BEST COLL.
REVS., http://www.bestcollegereviews.org/features/the-25-most-amazing-campus-studentrecreation-centers/, archived at http://perma.cc/96SR-6UJH (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (“In
an era when students are more . . . discerning than ever, university officials have gone on a
major building boom that has seen designer dorms, stunning libraries, and amazing
recreation centers . . . .”).
70
See ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 61 (“Advocates of big-time [athletic] programs argue
that a successful athletic program is a strong weapon in a university’s P.R. arsenal . . . .”).
71
Id. at 60.
72
DONNA M. DESROCHERS, DELTA COST PROJECT AT AMERICAN INSTS. FOR
RESEARCH, ACADEMIC SPENDING VERSUS ATHLETIC SPENDING: WHO WINS? 10 (2013),
available at http://www.deltacostproject.org/sites/default/files/products/DeltaCostAIR_
AthleticAcademic_Spending_IssueBrief.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DV2W-969P
(“Fewer than one in four of the 97 public FBS [Football Bowl Subdivision] athletic
departments generated more money than they spent in any given year between 2005 and
2010 . . . .”).
73
See ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 63 (explaining that a “visible” athletic program gives
supporters something tangible to rally around, adds to the relevance and value of the school’s
brand, and provides free advertising).
74
RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED, INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY 6
(2001).
75
Id. (explaining that “massive layoffs and restructuring” were the impetuses behind
this wave).
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and “big government”76 respectively. The third wave, which brought scrutiny upon
higher education, was largely the result of fiscal pressures that prompted many to
question the value of higher education.77 Specifically, did the tangible outcomes
produced by the nation’s colleges and universities justify the costs, particularly the
public cost, of supporting these institutions? For institutions, this question was not
readily answerable. Access had previously been the touchstone by which higher
education was judged.78 That focus was an outgrowth of the civil rights and War on
Poverty eras when higher education was seen as a cure to the nation’s racial and
economic ills. Focusing on outcomes (the end results) presented a novel perspective
from which to judge educational effectiveness, especially when the vast diversity of
institutions, their missions, and their students were considered.79
B. Emergence of For-Profit Colleges
Accompanying the “third wave” was another trend that would affect higher
education—the emergence of for-profit education providers. These institutions have
a long history dating back to colonial times;80 but it was during the 1990s that the
industry experienced immense growth and corporatization. The sector evolved from
being primarily composed of mom-and-pop operations awarding vocational
certificates to being dominated by large publicly traded or private equity owned
corporations awarding academic degrees as well.81 The sector’s emergence was
made possible in 1972 when Congress allowed students attending for-profit schools
to receive the newly mobile federal aid.82 The block grants previously awarded to
schools for student aid flowed only to not-for-profit institutions.83 Congress saw
expanding aid to students attending for-profit schools as a means of increasing
76
Id. (citing “government spending and the national deficit” as impetuses behind the
second wave).
77
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 190 (“When the economy stalls or inflation takes
off or the unemployment rate rises, colleges and universities are viewed with the same
crankiness as other major entities . . . .”).
78
Sandra R. Baum, Financial Aid to Low-Income College Students: Its History and
Prospects 5 (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 846-87, 1987), available
at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp84687.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/98JX-WV55 (discussing the influence that the “rising concern for the disadvantaged in the
quest for higher education” had on financial aid policy).
79
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 143–45.
80
RUCH, supra note 74, at 52.
81
See HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 31 (chronicling the corporatization of for-profit
higher education). The ten largest for-profit education corporations, all publicly traded,
enroll approximately 1,406,875 students, with Apollo Group, parent company of University
of Phoenix, accounting for 470,800 of that number. Id. at 20.
82
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 35.
83
Id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS:
MILLIONS SPENT TO TRAIN STUDENTS FOR OVERSUPPLIED OCCUPATIONS 5 (1997), available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97104.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9U4MTBMM.
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higher education access,84 and also as a means of encouraging competition among
institutions.85 There was a hope that this increased competition would drive down
costs of attendance—a laughable proposition in hindsight. For-profit institutions
rightfully viewed this expansion as a “bonanza.”86 Additionally, the 1998 revisions
of the HEA brought further legal and financial legitimacy to for-profit schools. They
were added to the “Definition of Institution of Higher Education for Purposes of
Title IV Programs,” which formally put them on equal footing with not-for-profit
schools.87
For-profit schools benefitted from the larger rhetorical context, in that they
spoke the language of commoditization: education was a product, students were
consumers, and learning could be tangible. They fully embraced “The Three Cs”—
competition, commodification, and commercialism88—notions that many viewed as
an affront, if not a threat, to traditional, mission-driven higher education.89 So while
Congress had essentially deemed all schools identical, irrespective of whether they
were driven by mission or profit, those divergent aims fostered fundamental
differences in how schools viewed themselves and presented themselves to the
public. The tangibility of outcomes was readily embraced by for-profit schools, and
they brought a classic business approach to marketing and recruitment. The larger
climate, typified by The Three Cs, would eventually force many not-for-profits to
take the same approach.
Today, most schools engage in some form of strategic self-promotion. The
overarching purpose of these efforts is to shape public perceptions of the institutions
and their programs. Favorable perceptions can attract strong students and faculty, as
well as garner broader financial and political support. The best promotional efforts
seek to build and nurture brands aligned with the institutional mission and goals.90
A brand is intangible—an image or perception.91 A brand is not specifically about
products, but a favorable brand can confer added value, or “brand equity,” upon
84

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 5.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 42 (“Federal legislation supported
marketlike competition for students among higher education institutions on the grounds that
greater efficiency would lead to cost reductions.”).
86
See RUCH, supra note 74, at 51–55; SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 36
(chronicling the corruption among for-profit schools that took place in the aftermath of the
1972 revisions).
87
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 103, 112 Stat.
1581, 1586–89 (1998) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012)).
88
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 86.
89
It is commonly asserted and largely accepted that the commoditization of education
is a relatively new phenomenon; but some argue that education has always been driven by
commercial interests, having started as a commercial endeavor and evolved into a missiondriven one. Id. at 52; see also SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 12 (“[C]olleges and
universities . . . [are] actors initiating academic capitalism, not just . . . players being
‘corporatized.’”).
90
ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 27.
91
Id. at 35 (“Branding is about asking, When a person hears our name, what does he or
she think about?”).
85
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products.92 In fact, strong brand equity can create demand for a weak product.93 In
some ways, this phenomenon is similar to the halo effect discussed earlier. But the
broad relevance of brands does not render products unimportant. Companies must
still create awareness of their products.94 Indeed it is often awareness that
differentiates similar products, not necessarily product quality or distinctiveness.95
In order to encourage product awareness, a company must identify potential
consumers and communicate with them via an effective marketing strategy.96
C. The Student Consumer
The most prominent consumers of higher education are students.97 But students
are more than passive purchasers of a product; they actually contribute to the
product’s quality. For example, strong students improve the overall educational
experience.98 This introduces another distinctive element into the higher education
consumer-provider relationship: selectivity. Given the manner in which students
influence the educational experience, most schools do not accept every applicant (or
prospective consumer) who is willing to pay the tuition (or cost of the educational

92

Id.
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 260 (“[A]lthough corporations
manufacture products, what consumers actually buy are brands . . . .”). For example, when
Phillip Morris bought Kraft in 1988, Kraft was worth only one-sixth of what Phillip Morris
paid for the company—on paper. The $12.6 billion price tag was largely for the Kraft brand,
not merely the traditional measure of company assets. Id. McDonald’s provides an example
of this phenomenon. McDonald’s food is often considered low quality, yet it has dominated
the fast-food industry for decades through strong brand equity. See, e.g., Ron Ruggless, KFC,
McDonald’s Most Powerful Brands in China, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS (July 7, 2013),
http://nrn.com/international/kfc-mcdonalds-among-most-powerful-brands-china, archived
at http://perma.cc/ZT73-VVPZ; McDonald’s Burgers Named Worst in America in Consumer
Reports’ New Fast-Food Survey, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (July 2, 2014),
http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2014/07/my-entry-1.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/WBD8-PSUS.
94
ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 51.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing the Elaboration Likelihood Model, which is a theory
of the process by which marketing communication prompts a customer to purchase a product
or service).
97
Higher education institutions cater to other consumers as well, including donors and
sponsors of research. But students are the dominant consumers of higher education. See, e.g.,
Caroline M. Hoxby, How the Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher Education Explains
College Tuition 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6323, 1997),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6323.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/53AY85QZ.
98
See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID
GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 113
(1998) (“[M]ixing weak and strong students raises the overall performance of the student
population as the gains of the weak students exceed the losses of the strong students.”).
93
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product).99 Selective schools often choose among large pools of prospective
consumers in determining which it finds meritorious enough to acquire access to the
product, akin to a doorman outside of a trendy South Beach nightclub. Even
nonselective schools tend to turn down some willing buyers.
This selectivity is typically the result of high student demand relative to the
supply of seats.100 Selectivity can serve as a proxy, albeit a flawed one, for quality.
Knowing this, schools often engage in efforts to manipulate selectivity indicators.101
They strategically deflate their admit rates by encouraging applications from
prospective students with little chance of gaining admission.102 Some schools also
deny the admission of strong applicants based on a belief that these applicants
consider the schools only as a fallback or “safety” choice.103 In the worst cases,
schools misrepresent student credentials in order to make their entering classes
appear stronger.104 But there is another, possibly more legitimate, motivation for
selectivity, and that is when students leave the institution, they become
representations of their educational experiences and of the institution itself.105 Put
differently, they become products of the product. So their successes or failures can
be compelling reflections of the educational products they purchased.
Federal policy has helped encourage a highly stratified system of higher
education in the United States. The Morrill Acts,106 initially passed in 1862 and
extended in 1890,107 greatly expanded public higher education, allowing these
institutions to join a landscape already populated by private, mostly religiousaffiliated institutions.108 These newly created public institutions tended to focus on
99

ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 13 (“Rather than selling to any willing and able buyer,
colleges and universities have a vested interest to ensure that who buys from them is a person
they want integrated into their largest input pool.”).
100
Eric Hoover, Application Inflation: Bigger Numbers Mean Better Students, Colleges
Say. But When Is Enough Enough?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/article/Application-Inflation/125277/, archived at http://perma.cc/66F
Z-XEE9.
101
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 290.
102
Hoover, supra note 100 (“Some deans and guidance counselors . . . question the
ethics of intense recruitment by colleges that reject the overwhelming majority of
applicants.”).
103
SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 290.
104
See, e.g., Supiano, supra note 11.
105
See, e.g., SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 44.
106
7 U.S.C §§ 301–305, 307–309 (2012) (originally enacted as Morill Acts of July 2,
1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503).
107
The federal government granted states thirty thousand acres of land per member of
Congress. States were free to dispose of the land as they wished, but were required to use the
proceeds to establish agricultural and mechanic arts education. See, e.g., Trow, supra note
54, at 57–58.
108
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Gladieux & Jacqueline E. King, The Federal Government
and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 152, 152–57 (Philip G. Altbach et al. eds.,
1999).
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the development of skills in a way the older schools had not.109 In addition, federal
financial aid policy combined with other factors, such as deregulated (and cheaper)
travel and communication costs, fostered increased student mobility.110 The result
was a higher education market where within-college homogeneity rose and betweencollege homogeneity fell.111 In other words, the individuals making up a particular
student body became more similar while the student bodies became more different
than others. This stratification led to the formation of niches. Much of this process
was the outcome of institutional competition.112 But the most strategic institutions
developed marketing strategies tailored to existing or aspirational niches. And while
these efforts were not limited to the for-profit sector, the sector embraced such
efforts as fundamental to its success.113
IV. FOR-PROFIT COLLEGE MARKETING AND RECRUITMENT
For-profit schools spend large amounts of money building brands and
generating awareness about their educational products. In 2009, the fifteen publicly
traded for-profit education corporations spent an average of $248 million each on
marketing and recruitment,114 which accounted for almost a quarter of their
collective total revenue.115 A couple of them spent almost a third of total revenue.116
This trend held industry wide, with the thirty for-profit education corporations
(publicly traded and privately held) dedicating 22.7% of revenue, or $4.2 billion, to
marketing and recruitment.117 By comparison, it has been estimated that not-for-

109
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 154
(2006) (explaining how the goal of the Morrill Act was “to promote the liberal and practical
education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life”).
110
Hoxby, supra note 97, at 46–48 (providing a detailed review of student mobility
trends and their causes).
111
Id. at 2 (“In the geographically integrated market, students . . . are sorted more
thoroughly among colleges based on their demand for education and ability to contribute to
education production.”).
112
Id. at 15 (“If students have heterogeneous demands for college quality, the result is
a market in which colleges produce education service at a number of different quality
levels.”).
113
ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 23 (“Commercial higher education’s profitability depends
largely on the staggering amount each institution spends on marketing and advertising.”);
see also ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 187 (“Being purely market-driven, for-profit
education targeted only those parts of the postsecondary education market that offered the
promise of greatest financial return.”).
114
This figure includes all expenses relating to marketing and recruitment, including
salaries for recruitment staff. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 81.
115
Id.
116
Grand Canyon University spent 32.6% of its total revenue on marketing and
recruitment; Bridgepoint Education spent 32.1%. Id.
117
Id.
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profit schools spend less than 5% of total revenue on these activities.118 On average,
for-profit schools spent more per student on marketing and recruitment than they did
on instruction—$2,622 versus $2,050.119 Apollo Group, the parent corporation of
University of Phoenix, spent two-and-a-half times more on seeking students than it
did on instructing them.120
For-profit schools spend so much on marketing and recruitment because their
very existence depends on a steady, robust stream of new students. A U.S. Senate
report provides a compelling illustration:
Corinthian Colleges, Inc.121 began 2010 with 86,066 students and ended
with 110,550, a growth of 24,484 students. But, in the same period,
113,317 students left the company (some by graduating or completing
programs), requiring Corinthian to enroll 137,831 new students to achieve
that growth. In other words, to achieve net enrollment growth, Corinthian
has to enroll the equivalent of its entire student body each year.122
Counteracting this churn requires a widely disseminated message tailored
effectively to the audience for whom it is intended. The for-profit college audience,
or niche, tends to comprise practical-minded individuals who are largely
unconcerned with prestige or the ancillary trappings of “college life.”123 They tend

118
ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 23 (citing a study, but warning that the estimate was made
without the benefit of firm numbers). While precise data on marketing and recruitment
spending among not-for-profit schools is hard to come by, it is safe to assume that it pales in
comparison to the for-profit sector, especially when compared to instructional spending.
Advertising and marketing expenditures are often classified as “institutional support”
expenses, along with other broad expenditures, including administrative staff salaries. See
DONNA M. DESROCHERS & JANE V. WELLMAN, DELTA COST PROJECT, TRENDS IN COLLEGE
SPENDING 1999-2000: WHERE DOES THE MONEY COME FROM? WHERE DOES IT GO? WHAT
DOES IT BUY? 21 (2011), available at http://deltacostproject.org/sites/default/files/products/
Trends2011_Final_090711.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R28D-HFQH. Given this
breadth, it can be assumed that advertising and marketing comprise only a small portion of
the overall institutional support expense category. A 2011 study of higher education spending
found that instructional expenditures were higher than institutional support expenditures
across all types of not-for-profit colleges and universities. Id. at 50–55.
119
Compare HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 81 (providing per student marketing
expenditures), with HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 87 (providing per student instructional
expenses).
120
Id. at 87.
121
Corinthian Colleges, Inc. is a publicly traded corporation with the fifth largest
enrollment—113,800 students in fall 2010. Id. at 20.
122
Id. at 77.
123
See, e.g., ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 22.
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to be older than so-called traditional students,124 with familial obligations;125
therefore, convenience is important.126 Fundamentally, what they are seeking is “a
no-nonsense academic experience tied to a practical outcome.”127 Knowing its niche,
for-profit institutions root their marketing pitch, and indeed their brand, in
outcomes-based tangibility. Unsurprisingly, they promote things such as career
preparation, comprehensive student services, and financial payoff. And they find the
pain.
A. Deceptive Marketing
ITT Technical Institutes128 markets its educational products with compelling
first-person ads featuring satisfied alumni. Below is a testimonial offered in a recent
ITT ad:
I was working 60, 70, 80 hours a week before I went to ITT Tech. I was at
work one day alone, and some people came into the restaurant through a
back entrance and robbed me at gunpoint. That was the final straw—and
that was when I found ITT Tech. It offers the ability to keep my job, to
spend time with my family . . . and I discovered that I could work and go
to school and progress all at the same time and get to where I wanted to
be—which is where I’m at now.129
The testimonial touches on major themes that a typical for-profit student would find
important: job preparation that allows for the maintenance of employment and
familial commitments, and that results in personal and professional advancement—
and much alleviated pain.

124

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS:
STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY
ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 7 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HN66-EBXG.
125
Enforcement of Federal Anti-Fraud Laws in For-Profit Education: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 109th Cong. 43 (2005) (statement of Nick Glakas,
President, Career College Association) [hereinafter Anti-Fraud Hearing] (stating that
proprietary schools enroll a large percentage of single mothers).
126
Id. at 46 (“Students choose to attend for-profit colleges because these delivery
methods meet their time and geographical needs, allowing them to achieve their
postsecondary education goals while continuing to meet the demands of their everyday
lives.”).
127
RUCH, supra note 74, at 134.
128
ITT Educational Services, Inc., the parent company of ITT Technical Institutes, is a
publicly traded corporation with the seventh largest enrollment—eighty-eight thousand as of
fall 2010. See, e.g., HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 21.
129
ITT Technical Inst., Russell Allred, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OFAKH3nJNY, archived at http:/perma.cc/U8VFNWNG.
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Corinthian marketed its Everest brand of colleges with a focus on academic and
student support. One commercial in particular is probably familiar to anyone who
watches daytime or late-night television. It featured an actor uttering a monologue,
as if speaking to a person from whose point of view the commercial is being
filmed.130 The actor speaks in an edgy tone that evinces the emotion of a “tough
love” speech.131 The commercial became an Internet meme, spawning hundreds, if
not thousands, of parodies.132 But humor aside, the commercial is another example
of how for-profit schools often market their programs:
You’re sitting on the couch, you’re watching TV, and your life is passing
you by. [You] keep procrastinating over and over, ‘Well maybe I’ll go to
school next year, maybe next semester,’ No, do it right now! They’ll work
with you after work or you can go before work. You can do whatever you
need to do to graduate. Go talk to somebody right now; [they’re] out to
help you. You spend all day on the phone anyhow! Why don’t you make
a phone call that is going to help you in your future?! All you gotta do is
pick up the phone and make the call. Why are you making it complicated?
It’s easy!133
The tone of the commercial is pain and shame. The actor’s ridiculing tone is
meant to intensify discontent a viewer might be feeling about being unemployed or
underemployed. In fact, the very viewing of the commercial is basically used as a
shaming tactic. But the goal of the commercial is clear: Corinthian wants to induce
the viewer to “pick up the phone” and reach out to one of Everest’s “helpful”
admissions officers, who of course are actually salespeople.
Both commercials are effective; they frame the educational product in terms
that their target audience would find attractive, if not compelling. They are proof
that even products that many consider inferior can be marketed successfully.134
Unfortunately, both ads are also misleading. The alumnus in the ITT ad speaks
authentically about the benefits he gained from the degree he earned. The
commercial, however, fails to make clear that the experience of the featured alumnus
is, by far, an atypical one. The graduation rate at the Greenville, South Carolina,

130

See Babablunte, Original, YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3bbFmZIdlBw, archived at https://perma.cc/K2T2-77W5 (user posting of original
monologue).
131
See id.
132
“Everest college parody” is actually an automatically populated search term on
YouTube. E.g., WhiteWoodEnt, Everest Commercial Parody, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbclWQY8S78, archived at http://perma.cc/W7BRD6NE.
133
Babablunte, supra note 130.
134
ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 23 (“[M]arketing and advertising . . . may not lead to a
better product or a better experience for the consumer, but it does lead to better awareness
and usually great purchasing volume.”).
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campus the alumnus attended is only 38%.135 In other words, the vast majority of
students who undertake studies at that ITT campus (or most any other136) leave
before obtaining the credential they sought. Thus, it seems safe to assume that, if
asked, the “typical” ITT alumnus would not offer such a glowing endorsement of
his former institution.
Companies have a First Amendment right to market their products.137 And they
are allowed to use consumer testimonials to promote atypical product outcomes, as
long as a disclaimer is provided.138 The purpose of the disclaimer is to prevent
deception; therefore, it must inform the reader or viewer of a testimonial’s atypical
nature. For obvious reasons, the disclaimer must be conspicuous and easy to
understand. For example, the Federal Trade Commission once ordered La Salle
University to cure deception in the manner in which it advertised its unaccredited
law degree program with disclaimers “in type the same size and appearance as the
advertising claims.”139
The Everest commercial is particularly egregious in its methods. It fully
embraces the “university as car dealer” posture that represents an extreme
conception of how some institutions comport themselves within the higher education
market.140 In addition to the inherent deception that comes with suggesting that
education and career success are “easy,” the commercial exudes a pushiness that
would be akin to an accosting if done in person. And like the ITT ad, the Everest
commercial displays no disclaimer warning the viewer of the school’s low
completion rates141 or any of the other negative outcomes.142

135

College Navigator, ITT Technical Institute-Greenville, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=itt+tech&s=SC&id=41
3866, archived at http://perma.cc/NF98-P45M (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (listing various
statistics for the campus).
136
Fifty-two percent of ITT students who enrolled during the 2008–09 school year
withdrew by 2010. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 532.
137
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)
(“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project
it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”).
138
See 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(c) (2014) (requiring a conspicuous disclosure of typical
results when an atypical testimonial is offered).
139
The commission found that La Salle had misrepresented the program’s
accreditation—a common complaint against for-profit schools as well. In re La Salle
Extension Univ., 78 F.T.C. 1272, 1279–81 (1971).
140
ZEMSKY ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (“From the car dealer perspective, universities
wheel and deal in the marketplace . . . .”).
141
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., Everest’s parent company, has an overall student
withdrawal rate of 66% from its Associate’s degree programs and 59% among its much
smaller Bachelor’s degree enrollment. Both of these rates are above average for the industry
as a whole. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 74.
142
For example, more than 36% of students at Corinthian-owned schools who entered
student loan repayment in 2005 defaulted within three years—a rate more than three times
higher than the average for all institutions. Id. at 116.
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B. Deceptive Recruitment
The methods employed in these commercials, particularly the methods used by
Everest, align closely with the methods used by for-profit college admissions
officers. This coordination is intentional, as the individual components of any
effective marketing plan are integrated in furtherance of the same goal.143 The Senate
investigation of the industry confirmed many of the allegations made in the suit
against EDMC. Boiler-room environments engender the use of aggressive and
deceptive sales tactics.144 New student enrollment goals flow down the
administrative chain “from [the] CEO to newly-hired junior recruiters.”145 And even
when unlawful incentive compensation plans are not in place, job security
throughout the company hinges on attaining enrollment growth goals.146
At many for-profit schools, everything about an admissions officer’s job rests
within sales culture. They are not only expected to hit enrollment goals, but as
precursors, they are also expected to make a certain number of recruitment phone
calls, schedule a certain number of prospect appointments, and generate a certain
number of admissions applications.147 Each admission officer’s progress is
meticulously tracked, with perks and punishments awarded accordingly.148
Unsurprisingly, employment turnover is high among admissions officers.149 Also
unsurprising is the use of deceptive and aggressive sales tactics. The foundation of
the success of these tactics, and indeed the entire sales strategy, is trust. Admissions
officers—often salespeople posing as counselors—are directed to build trust with
prospective students from the very first call.150 This is when the admissions officer
frames herself as a counselor, while actually seeking to do whatever it takes to get
the prospective student to sign an enrollment contract.151
Deceptive tactics often take the form of misrepresentations about program
costs, program length, graduation rates, transferability of credits, and job placement
and salary data. Sometimes admissions officers flat-out lie (e.g., understating

143

ANCTIL, supra note 58, at 27 (discussing the importance of aligning an institution’s
marketing plan with its strategic plan).
144
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 47 (“At many [for-profit] schools . . . misleading
students to secure enrollment contracts appeared to be a common practice rather than an
exception.”).
145
Id. at 50.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 51.
148
Id. (explaining the discipline process used by ITT for admissions officers who failed
to meet recruitment-related goals); see also Joint Complaint, supra note 33, at 28–29
(describing the EDMC Guide to the Admissions Performance Plan).
149
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 52; see also Joint Complaint, supra note 33, at 38
(alleging a desire by an EDMC executive to increase the proportion of admissions officers
who were fired for failure to meet enrollment targets from 17% to 25%).
150
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 48.
151
Id. at 54.
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program costs).152 Other times, they use savvier methods. For example, the Senate
investigation found that admissions officers were instructed to quote program costs
per term, rather than per year.153 Such a tactic was expected to result in prospects
understating program costs, based on an assumption that the school offered the
standard number of two to three enrollment terms per year, rather than the five it
actually offered.154 Some admissions officers were instructed to deflect questions
about costs, even flatly refusing to answer them, if necessary.155
Minimum, or “best-case,” program lengths are expressed in “worst-case”
terms.156 Low graduation rates are inflated or described using vague terms, such as
“good.”157 Prospects are not told that credits earned from for-profit schools are
unlikely to be accepted by other institutions.158 And job placement and salary data
are inflated159 or otherwise characterized using puffery and intentional vagueness.
These admissions officers are trained in advanced techniques of closing the
deal. They are trained to take information disclosed to them by prospects, likely
under a delusion of trust, and use it to induce the prospect to enroll. This is how the
pain is found and, when necessary, poked.160 When prospects show reluctance,
officers employ tactics such as hypothetical imagery (e.g., “Imagine your life with a
degree.”) and false urgency (e.g., “We only have a few seats left in the class.”).161
And of course, throughout the process, admissions officers are expected to remain
in close contact with prospective students—selling, cajoling, and pressuring. A
federal investigator posing as a prospective student received over 180 phone calls
within a month of expressing interest in a for-profit academic program.162
In creating product awareness, for-profit schools target individuals they believe
will be most receptive to their message. There is nothing inherently wrong with this
tactic; in fact, consumer targeting is essential to any effective marketing plan. Forprofit schools, however, often target individuals based on their susceptibility to
152

Id. (providing an example where an admissions counselor told a prospect that a
program cost $9,500 per year, when the actual cost was $12,000).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
For example, four-year programs were described as if the timeframe was a functional
maximum instead of the functional minimum. Id.
157
Id. at 55 (recounting an incident when an admissions counselor described his
school’s 25% graduation rate as “good”).
158
Id. at 56 (“Too often, students do not learn that their credits will not transfer until
after they leave school.”).
159
An admissions counselor described the elements of her deceptive pitch as: “We are
telling you that you are going to have a 95 percent change [sic] [of getting] . . . a job paying
$35,000 to $40,000 a year by the time you are done in 18 months.’’ Anti-Fraud Hearing,
supra note 125, at 8–9.
160
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 60–61 (showing how “poking the pain” by
“remind[ing] [prospective students] what things will be like if they don’t continue forward
and earn their degrees” has been explained in for-profit school sales training manuals).
161
Id. at 63–64.
162
Id. at 67.

UTAH LAW REVIEW

448

[NO. 2

being victimized by slick, if not shady, marketing and recruitment tactics. A
Vatterott College163 training manual listed the following targeted demographics:
“Welfare Mom w/Kids. Pregnant Ladies. Recent Divorce. Low Self-Esteem. Low
Income Jobs. Experienced a Recent Death. Physically/Mentally Abused. Recent
Incarceration. Drug Rehabilitation. Dead-End Jobs-No Future.”164
A compelling argument could be made that members of disadvantaged and
vulnerable populations should be targeted for higher education opportunity. That is
the underlying premise of our long-held access goals. However, exploitation
masquerading as opportunity does more harm than good, resulting in educational
failure and increased pain, often in the form of increased student loan debt.
C. Educational Failure
Recruitment deception contributes to bad educational matches, and bad
educational matches lead to educational failure.165 The most salient form of higher
education failure is the noncompletion of a degree or certification program after
having acquired student loan debt. This form of failure is observed in all sectors of
higher education, but it is particularly endemic to the for-profit sector.
In programs of two years or less,166 the for-profit sector leads all others with a
60% completion rate.167 Among private and public institutions, the rate was 51%
and 20% respectively.168 At the bachelor’s degree level, however, the for-profit
sector had, by far, the lowest completion rate—28%, compared to 65% for private
institutions and 56% for public.169 Attainment trends reflect in some part the type of
student an institution serves. Disparities along racial and ethnic as well as
socioeconomic lines have been observed throughout higher education.170 So an
argument could be made that the comparatively woeful bachelor’s completion rates
within the for-profit sector are a reflection of the type of student it targets. In fact,
163

Vatterott Education Holdings, Inc. is a private equity owned corporation with an
enrollment of 11,200 in fall 2010. Id. at 23.
164
Id. at 58.
165
Brian A. Jacob & Tamara Wilder, Educational Expectations and Attainment 18
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15683, 2010) (“The fact that most
students attain less education than they expect . . . suggests that misinformation is the cause
of the gap.”).
166
These programs typically award associate’s degrees and vocational certificates.
167
AUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 108 (listing overall rate of 30%); see also id. (“The
graduation rate was calculated as the total number of students who completed a degree within
150 percent of the normal time to degree attainment . . . .”).
168
Id.
169
Id. (listing the overall rate of 58%).
170
For example, students of Asian/Pacific Islander descent have a bachelor’s degree
graduation rate of 69% (the highest rate) while black students and Native American students
graduate at a rate of 39% each. Id.; see also, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-97-103, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: POORER STUDENT OUTCOMES AT SCHOOLS
THAT RELY MORE ON FEDERAL STUDENT AID 3 (1997) (documenting a negative association
between reliance on federal financial aid and completion rates).
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public institutions with open admission policies, similar to those used by for-profit
schools, have a comparably low average graduation rate of 29%.171 So the outcomes
observed among for-profit colleges are, in part, the result of larger factors that affect
higher education overall.
The effects of higher education failure, however, are more debilitating for
students who attend for-profit institutions. These schools tend to be relatively
expensive, especially when compared to public schools, and reliance on student
loans is greater among their students. At $28,805, the average cost of attendance for
a for-profit associate’s or certificate program is the highest among all institution
types, almost double the public (in-state) average.172 For bachelor’s degree
programs, for-profit schools are more expensive than public schools, but less
expensive than private nonprofits.173 These trends, once again, reflect the lower
levels of revenue diversification within the for-profit sector, particularly the absence
of public appropriations and endowment income.
Cost trends among for-profit schools collide with the socioeconomic
demographics of their students—and the result is the highest average student loan
debt in higher education. For starters, students at for-profit institutions take out
student loans at a higher proportion than students at any other type of school. Eightysix percent of full-time for-profit bachelor’s degree students borrowed money for
school, compared to 63% and 50% of students at private and public schools
respectively.174 Other data that includes part-time students and all program types
assert a whopping 96% borrowing rate for students at for-profit schools.175
Unscrupulous admission officers contribute to this trend by using various unseemly
tactics, including offering prospective students misleading or evasive information
about loans.176
Students at for-profit schools also borrow the most money—on average, $8,035
per year for associate’s degree and certificate students and $9,641 for bachelor’s
degree students.177 Unsurprisingly, graduates of for-profit schools are most likely to
be “high debt borrowers,” defined as having debt loads exceeding $30,000.178 A
171

AUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 108 (highlighting the association between institutional
selectivity and graduation rates).
172
The in-state average among public institutions is $15,278; the private school average
is $25,773. Id. at 99. These figures assume that the student is living off campus and not with
family members. Id.
173
At $40,148, private institutions have the highest average bachelor’s degree cost of
attendance. Id. The costs at for-profit and public institutions are $29,114 and $21,665
respectively. These figures assume that the student is living off campus and not with family
members. Id.
174
Id. at 100.
175
Based on this data, borrowing rates were 57% and 48% among bachelor’s degree
students at private and public institutions, respectively, and 13% among community college
students. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 112.
176
Id. at 63–70.
177
AUD ET AL., supra note 12, at 101.
178
REBECCA HINZE-PIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF
COLLEGE STUDENT BORROWING 6 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010
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majority (54%) of for-profit bachelor’s degree holders graduated at the high-debt
level, compared to a quarter of degree holders from private institutions and just 12%
from public institutions.179 The trend held at the associate’s level as well.180 But the
real fallout occurs when students borrow money for school, but fail to complete the
program.
A recent study concluded that 86% of for-profit program noncompleters
acquired federal student loan debt.181 For 31% of that number, their debt was equal
to or exceeded their income.182 In other words, out of every one hundred for-profit
school noncompleters, eighty-six left with federal loans, and, for twenty-seven, that
debt was at least as high as their income. These figures are highest among all
institution types.183 For-profit noncompleters also borrowed more per credit than all
other students, including other noncompleters.184 Noncompleters tend to make less
money and have higher unemployment rates,185 with both trends affecting their
ability to repay their loans. According to the latest data, 19.1% of former for-profit
students (including completers) defaulted on federal loans within three years of

/11/social-trends-2010-student-borrowing.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KAN2-F65U.
179
Id.
180
At the associate’s level, 17% of graduates of for-profits schools were high-debt
borrowers, compared to 12% and 2% among private and public institution graduates
respectively. Id.
181
Among public institutions, 25% of students who failed to complete a two-year
program took out federal loans; the rate was 54% among students who left four-year schools.
For private schools, the rate was 66%. CHRISTINA CHANG WEI & LAURA HORN, NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEBT BURDEN OF
NONCOMPLETERS 7 (2013), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013155.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/5SGZ-MUAM.
182
Among public institutions, 7% of students who failed to complete a two-year
program had federal student loan debt that exceeded their income; the rate was 13% among
students who left four-year schools. Id. at 12. For private schools, the rate was 21%. Id.
183
Id. at 7, 11–12.
184
Noncompleters across all institution types borrowed more per credit than
completers, with for-profit noncompleters far exceeding all others having borrowed $350 per
credit. Id. at 9. Among public institutions, noncompleters of two-year programs borrowed
$80 per credit and four-year program noncompleters borrowed $130 per credit. Private
school noncompleters borrowed $190 per credit. Id.
185
See, e.g., id. at 10 (finding higher unemployment rates among noncompleters across
all institution types when compared to completers, as well as lower annual income for
noncompleters, except among those who left for-profit schools, who were found to make
slightly more than completers); MARY NGUYEN, EDUC. SECTOR, DEGREELESS IN DEBT:
WHAT HAPPENS TO BORROWERS WHO DROP OUT 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.educationsector.org/sites/default/files/publications/DegreelessDebt_CYCT_RE
LEASE.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KB23-ULJL (finding that certificate program
completers had higher unemployment rates than noncompleters overall, but for-profit
noncompleters had the highest unemployment rate).
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entering repayment, compared to 12.9% and 7.2% of former students from public
and private schools respectively.186
As guarantors of federal student loans, taxpayers are collectively responsible
for covering these defaults. In fact, when you consider the total of investment of
taxpayer money in higher education, including grant programs, it becomes clear that
“American taxpayers are the single biggest investor in for-profit colleges,”187 as well
as significant investors in higher education overall.188 Therefore, there is significant
need for the discouragement of higher education recruitment deception, given its
contributions to higher education failure and the resulting public costs.
V. LIMITED PATHS TO REDRESS
Financial penalties can be effective at discouraging unscrupulous behavior.
Unfortunately, the potential penalties for deception in higher education recruitment
lack any real discouraging effect. As mentioned earlier, paths to redress for victims
of this deception are largely unviable. And even though attempts have been made to
strengthen administrative and regulatory oversight, penalties for unscrupulous
behavior remain weak. Financial penalties can be effective at discouraging
unscrupulous behavior. Unfortunately, the potential penalties for higher education
recruitment deception lack any real discouraging effect. Accrediting agencies and
state and federal governments have not adequately addressed these concerns. And
even though attempts have been made to strengthen administrative and regulatory
oversight, penalties for unscrupulous behavior remain weak. The False Claims Act,
which allows individuals to bring claims against those allegedly defrauding the
federal government, additionally does not adequately address this issue. Paths to
redress, such as tort and contract claims for victims of this deception, are largely
unviable.
A. The Triad
The regulatory framework governing institutions eligible to collect federal
financial aid funds is often referred to as “the triad.”189 The components of the
triad—accrediting agencies, states, and the federal government—are charged with

186

FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FY 2011 3-YEAR OFFICIAL NATIONAL
COHORT DEFAULT RATES (2014), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/
attachments/2014OfficialFY20113YRCDRBriefing.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S5H8WHSW.
187
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (“For-profit colleges now collect almost 25
percent of total Federal student aid money . . . over a third of GI bill education benefits to
veterans, and half of all active duty servicemember tuition assistance dollars.”).
188
Id. at 24 (noting that during the 2009–10 school year, the federal government
disbursed more than $130 billion in higher education loans and grants, with the for-profit
sector collecting $32 billion of that total).
189
See, e.g., id. at 122.
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ensuring that “schools are meeting basic guarantees of academic quality and fiscal
soundness, and that they are complying with pertinent state and federal laws.”190
1. Accrediting Agencies
In order to collect federal financial aid funds, schools must typically be
accredited by an organization recognized by the ED to perform academic and fiscal
assessments of higher education institutions.191 These private, not-for-profit
agencies “develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer evaluations to assess whether
or not those criteria are met.”192 Given their function, these agencies essentially serve
as “gatekeepers” to the federal financial aid system.193 Their seals of approval can
mean the difference between viability and death for institutions.
Unfortunately, these agencies have historically done little to protect students
from recruitment deception. Federal law grants institutions wide latitude in defining
their own missions and, as a result, dictating the standards by which they are
judged.194 This latitude is a reflection of the vast diversity of institutions and the
resulting infeasibility of most one-size-fits-all approaches. Thus, a school with
dismal outcomes, exacerbated by unscrupulous admissions practices, is at little risk
of facing significant accreditation sanctions.195

190

Id.
Private regional and national accrediting organizations provide the bulk of higher
education accreditation; however, the ED also recognizes state agencies for purposes of
accrediting public vocational education programs. 34 C.F.R. § 603 (2014). Preaccredited notfor-profit institutions, those deemed by an accrediting agency to be making timely progress
towards accreditation, are allowed to collect federal financial aid funds as well. See, e.g., 34
C.F.R. § 600.4 (2014); see also Administrators / Financial Aid for Postsecondary Students:
Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., available at
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9CFAWBBP (last modified Jan. 13, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. Accreditation] (follow “Accrediting
Agencies Recognized for Title IV Purposes” hyperlink to view list of agencies recognized to
accredit institutions for purposes of federal financial aid).
192
U.S. Accreditation, supra note 191 (follow “Overview of Accreditation” hyperlink).
193
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 122.
194
20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring accreditation agencies to assess an
institution’s “student achievement in relation to the institution’s mission” and allowing the
imposition of “different standards for different institutions or programs.”).
195
See, e.g., HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 127–28 (illustrating how a school with
rapid growth and dismal retention rates, characteristics of a “churn and burn” admissions
operation, could nonetheless receive a favorable accreditation assessment). But see Allison
Sherry, Westwood College’s Main Denver Campus Placed on Probation by National
Accrediting
Body,
DENVER
POST
(Sept.
21,
2010,
1:00
AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_16129512, archived at http://perma.cc/3HJA-94DH
(giving an example that a college “campus has been put on probation by its national
accrediting body because of concerns about the private, for-profit’s student achievement,
recruitment techniques and management”).
191
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Agencies are engaging in new attempts at holding schools accountable for
student outcomes. As the president of the Western Association of Schools and
Colleges (WASC)196 recently remarked, “Accreditation needs to be more responsive
. . . to the public’s demands for more accountability. . . . The times have changed.
People need to know more.”197 Motivated by the changing times, WASC has
imposed new standards, premised on making published data more useful and
transparent. For example, WASC now requires schools to disaggregate outcomes
data by “racial, ethnic, gender, age, economic status, disability, and other categories,
as appropriate,” so as to highlight demographic disparities.198 But, hamstrung by
federal law, the standards still allow institutions to benchmark their outcomes
“against [their] own aspirations as well as the rates of peer institutions.”199
The Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS)200 has
revamped its standards many times in recent years to reflect the national trend
toward outcomes-based assessment. It measures institutional effectiveness along six
outcomes-based indicators, including retention, placement, graduate satisfaction,
employer satisfaction, learning objectives, and graduation rates.201 But again, no
tangible standards around those outcomes are imposed.
Critics of the accreditation framework assert that agencies face an inherent
conflict of interest, given that their existence is financed by the very schools they
are responsible for assessing.202 Worsening matters is a competitive accreditation
market where schools are sometimes free to cherry pick agencies with the laxest

196

WASC is one of the six regional accrediting agencies. The agency accredits
institutions in California and Hawaii, the territories of Guam, American Samoa, Federated
States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands,
the Pacific Basin, and areas of the Pacific and East Asia. Institutions, WASC: SENIOR COLL.
& UNIV. COMM’N, http://www.wascsenior.org/institutions, archived at http://perma.cc/5X
F2-XEVD (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
197
Eric Kelderman, Accreditors Examine Their Flaws as Calls for Change Intensify,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 13, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Accreditors-ExamineTheir/129765/, archived at http://perma.cc/97TZ-52BR.
198
W. ASS’N OF SCHS. & COLLS., 2013 HANDBOOK OF ACCREDITATION 14 (2013),
available at http://www.wascsenior.org/files/penultimatedrafthandbookv2.1.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/U769-SDGQ.
199
Id.
200
ACICS bills itself as “the largest national accrediting organization of degree granting
institutions.” It accredits professional, technical, and occupational programs. About ACICS,
ACCREDITING COUNCIL FOR INDEP. COLLS. & SCHS., http://www.acics.org/, archived at
http://perma.cc/7M77-3JWY (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
201
ACCREDITING COUNCIL FOR INDEP. COLLS. & SCHS., ACCREDITATION CRITERIA:
POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND STANDARDS 38 (2014), available at http://www.acics.org/
accreditation/content.aspx?id=3822, archived at http://perma.cc/WM3Y-K4U2 (follow
“Accreditation Criteria (PDF)” hyperlink).
202
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 124 (likening the fee arrangements under which
accreditation agencies operate to those of “Wall Street credit ratings agencies that rubberstamped mortgage-backed securities and other instruments that later incurred large losses”).
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standards, thereby disincentivizing accreditation rigor.203 Whatever the reason,
accrediting agencies provide little protection for students.
2. States
State oversight can take many forms. States are required by the HEA to legally
authorize the colleges and universities within their borders,204 and most do so
through a public agency.205 These agencies are required to have “a process to review
and appropriately act on complaints concerning the institution.”206 States also have
consumer protections statutes and related agencies that can serve as complaint
portals for victims of recruitment deception.
States have made some attempts at protecting students. Keiser College207
recently entered into an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance (AVC) with the State
of Florida after the attorney general filed suit accusing the school of various
violations of the state’s consumer protection laws.208 Pursuant to the AVC, the
school agreed to comply with various disclosure directives, including disclosing
information “clearly and conspicuously” to prospective students.209 The Colorado
attorney general recently settled a consumer protection suit against Westwood
College210 for $4.5 million. The suit alleged that Westwood had “mis[led]
203

Id. (“[I]f a particular accrediting agency gets a reputation for being too tough,
schools can opt for other, more lenient accreditors.”).
204
See, e.g., id. at 130.
205
See, e.g., SHEEO Members, STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS ASS’N,
http://www.sheeo.org/our-members, archived at http://perma.cc/S9MB-2JR9 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015) (providing links to state higher education oversight agencies).
206
34 C.F.R. § 600.9(a)(1) (2014); see also STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS
ASS’N., SHEEO STATE AUTHORIZATION SURVEY: STUDENT COMPLAINT INFORMATION BY
STATE AND AGENCY (2012), available at http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/Complaint
%20Process%20Links%2012-2012.pdf, archived at http:/perma.cc/ZF7J-3E78 (providing
links to student complaint portals for almost every state higher education oversight agency).
207
Keiser was a for-profit institution before becoming a nonprofit institution in 2011,
after being purchased by Everglades University, a Florida-based nonprofit institution. Scott
Travis, Keiser University Celebrates 35th Year by Becoming a Nonprofit, SUN SENTINEL
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-09-12/news/fl-keiser-anniversary20110912_1_keiser-university-scholarship-fund-evelyn-keiser, archived at http://perma.cc/
V3VQ-9YJ2.
208
DEP’T OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF FLA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., IN THE
INVESTIGATION OF KEISER UNIVERSITY, ET AL., No. L10-3-1201, at 1–2 (2012), available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/JMEE-8ZLPRT/$file/KeiserUniversity.pdf,
archived at http:/perma.cc/GGZ6-QVYB (“The Department has investigated allegations that
Respondents made certain misrepresentations, misleading statements or otherwise omitted
or failed to disclose material information . . . .”).
209
Id. at 4.
210
Alta Colleges, Inc., Westwood’s parent company, had an enrollment of 19,190 in
fall 2010. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 164. In 2009, Alta Colleges had an overall student
withdrawal rate of 58% from its Associate’s degree programs and 57% among its Bachelor’s
degree enrollment. Id. at 74–75.
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prospective students, engag[ed] in deceptive advertising and fail[ed] to comply with
Colorado’s consumer lending laws.”211 Kentucky212 and Illinois213 have also filed
consumer protection suits against schools arising out of alleged recruitment and
marketing improprieties.
The problem with state oversight, however, is that it is often inconsistent and
sometimes “anemic.”214 Budget cuts and seeming conflicts of interests have
significantly reduced the investigative and enforcement power of some state
oversight agencies.215 There has been much concern on the part of the ED that states
have deferred to accrediting agencies on issues of oversight, thereby lessening the
effectiveness of the triad.216 Consumer protection statutes provide private rights to
sue, which could be useful to victims of recruitment deception. But formidable
standards of proof (discussed in more detail later) often forestall any real prospect
of redress.
3. Federal Government
The HEA gives the ED broad responsibility in regulating higher education. The
ED’s primary higher education functions are to certify and regulate accrediting
agencies, administer the disbursal of federal financial aid,217 determine institutional

211

Press Release, Cynthia Coffman, Att’y Gen., Colo. Dep’t Law, Attorney General
Announces $4.5 Million Settlement with Westwood College to Address Deceptive Business
Practices (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/
2012/03/14/attorney_general_announces_45_million_settlement_westwood_college_addre
ss_dece, archived at http:/perma.cc/J4Q5-QCUN.
212
See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Att’y Gen., Attorney General Conway Files Suit
Against Daymar College (July 27, 2011), available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/news
room/ag/daymarsuit, archived at http://perma.cc/FW9C-YQD6.
213
See, e.g., Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madigan Sues National ForProfit College (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2012_01/
20120118.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VMB3-SDAQ.
214
Benjamin Lesser & Greg B. Smith, As Complaints Mount, Anemic State Agency
Overwhelmed by Job of Policing For-Profit Schools, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2011, 4:00
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/complaints-mount-anemic-state-agencyoverwhelmed-job-policing-for-profit-schools-article-1.149897, archived at http://perma.cc/
PU89-ZZ97.
215
HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 130.
216
Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 460 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
217
34 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2014).
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eligibility to collect federal financial aid,218 serve as a source of information for the
public,219 and promote federal priorities.220
The ED requires institutions to “make available” certain data to prospective and
enrolled students.221 Among the data required to be disclosed are retention and
completion data,222 job placement rates,223 and costs of attendance.224 The premise
of these requirements is clear: to help students make better educational choices. But
a recent report found many colleges to be out of compliance with the
requirements.225 The report also criticized the statute, arguing that “flaws in the way
the statute was written . . . ha[s] rendered much of the information all but useless . .
. .”226 For example, almost 20% of sampled institutions failed to publish or otherwise
provide placement data, and even among institutions that were in compliance,
variable presentation formats (allowed by “loose” federal mandates) rendered much
of the information unhelpful, if not misleading.227
The ED regulations ban the use of “substantial” misrepresentations by
institutions collecting federal financial aid.228 Misrepresentation is defined as “[a]ny
false, erroneous or misleading statement” made by an institution or the institution’s
representative.229 A misrepresentation is rendered “substantial” when “the person to
whom it was made could reasonably be expected to rely, or has reasonably relied, to
218
For example, the ED calculates student loan default rates in determining whether
schools remain eligible to collect federal student aid, irrespective of whether they remain
accredited. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., COHORT DEFAULT RATE EFFECTS:
SANCTIONS AND BENEFITS 2.4-2 (2012), http://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/
attachments/CDRGuideCh2Pt4CDREffects.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GQ6RWXNY.
219
For example, the ED publishes an array of data about educational institutions that
collect federal financial aid. Inst. of Educ. Scis., Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/, archived at http://perma.cc/6XBKVTD7 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
220
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2014, at
7 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2011-14/plan-2011.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q57Q-6UT9 (“This [Strategic] Plan lays out a strategy that ties
the day-to-day work of the Department to accomplishing the President’s 2020 Goal.”).
221
34 C.F.R. § 668.41(d) (2014).
222
Id. § 668.41(d)(3) to (4).
223
Id. § 668.41(d)(5).
224
Id. § 668.43(a)(1) (2014) (including tuition and fees, books and supplies, room and
board, transportation, and other relevant costs).
225
See KEVIN CAREY & ANDREW P. KELLY, EDUC. SECTOR, THE TRUTH BEHIND
HIGHER EDUCATION DISCLOSURE LAWS 1 (2011), available at http://www.educationsector.
org/sites/default/files/publications/HigherEdDisclosure_RELEASE.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/GJ8P-ZP46.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 8 (“[D]isclosure requirements for ‘placement in employment’ are loose enough
to allow . . . institutions of all types . . . to promote success stories and hide the areas where
they fall short.”).
228
34 C.F.R. § 668.71(a) (2014).
229
Id. § 668.71(c).
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that person’s detriment.”230 The ban applies to “marketing, advertising, recruiting or
admissions services”231 and covers misrepresentations made regarding “the nature
of [an institution’s] educational program, its financial charges, or the employability
of its graduates.”232 A school that violates the ban can have its financial aid eligibility
restricted or suspended or be fined up to $27,500 per violation.233
To facilitate the reporting of recruitment deception and other improprieties, the
ED provides an online form through which anyone can lodge a complaint.234
Unfortunately, the investigation of recruitment deception does not appear to be a
priority.235 The following quote sums up the shortcomings of the ED’s oversight in
this area:
For schools, there are few disincentives to engage in deceptive or
fraudulent behavior when enrolling students. The maximum fine imposed
by the ED for a “substantial” misrepresentation is . . . a nominal amount
in the grand scheme of things. ED can strip a school of its federal financial
aid eligibility, but is reluctant to pursue such sanctions, even when
appropriate. Making matters worse, [a Government Accountability Office]
study found the ED’s methods of detecting some forms of noncompliance
with financial aid rules to be inadequate.236
There is also some question about whether the savviest acts of deception would
even fall under the purview of the ban. Does attempting to understate program costs
by quoting tuition rates on a per term basis amount to a substantial misrepresentation
if the quoted rate is accurate? Such a statement may be seen as misleading, but that
conclusion would certainly be debatable in a legal context. And because
misrepresentations take the form of statements, the ban does not apply to a refusal
to quote a tuition rate at all, even if the intent is to deceive by omission.
The ED has recognized that its regulations are “too lax,” and in recent years has
attempted to broaden provisions and clear up ambiguities in ways that it believes
will aid enforcement.237 The ED sought to implement “gainful employment”

230

Id.
Id.
232
Id. § 668.71(b).
233
See Id. §§ 668.84–.86.
234
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., COMPLAINT FORM, available
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/oighotline.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B9
KN-FH3P (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
235
Anti-Fraud Hearing, supra note 125, at 23 (“[T]he Department does not investigate
charges made by students regarding misrepresentations made to influence students to enroll
. . . .”).
236
Aaron N. Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging
Federal Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 38 J. LEGIS. 185, 214–15 (2012).
237
Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
231
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standards;238 broaden the definition of “misrepresentation”; eliminate all safe
harbors, or exceptions, to the incentive compensation ban; and require states to have
a process for handling complaints against schools as part of their authorization
responsibilities.239 These new regulations were challenged in two court cases
brought by the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU)—
an association of for-profit education providers.
(a) Defining Gainful Employment
Federal law requires that all educational programs offered by for-profit
institutions and vocational programs offered by not-for-profit institutions “prepare
students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”240 Congress, however,
failed to define or explain the hallmarks of gainful employment.241 So in 2010, the
ED attempted to add an element of specificity to the concept.242 Specifically, the ED
sought to impose three regulations;243 the most significant promulgated two tests—
one that used debt-to-income ratios and another that used student loan repayment
rates—to measure whether a program was in compliance with the gainful
employment requirement.244 If, after application of these tests, a program was
deemed out of compliance with gainful employment dictates, it could have its
financial aid eligibility restricted or revoked, and it could be required to provide
disclaimers to students.245
Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, the student loan repayment test was vacated
after the court concluded the ED employed an arbitrary eligibility threshold.246 This
conclusion prompted the court to also vacate the otherwise appropriate debt-toincome test (and the entire regulation), due to its lack of severability from the student

238

See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 930 F. Supp. 2d 210
(D.D.C. 2013) (explaining ED’s attempts to impose gainful employment standards).
239
See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs., 681 F.3d at 434 (explaining the
ED’s attempts to broaden the definition of “misrepresentation,” eliminate safe harbors, and
require state grievance processes).
240
34 C.F.R. § 668.8 (2014).
241
See Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 145
(D.D.C. 2012).
242
Id. at 146 (“The means of determining whether a program ‘prepares students for
gainful employment in a recognized occupation’ is a considerable gap, which the Department
has promulgated rules to fill.”).
243
One regulation sought to measure whether a program was providing gainful
employment to former students; the second created the mandate for schools to report income
and debt statistics to the ED; the final measure required schools to submit new programs to
the ED for approval based on gainful employment dictates. Id. at 143.
244
Id. at 141–42, 153–54 (providing a detailed explanation of both tests).
245
Id. at 142–43.
246
Id. at 154 (“Because the Department has not provided a reasonable explanation [for
the student loan repayment eligibility threshold], the court must conclude that it was chosen
arbitrarily.”).
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loan repayment test.247 This decision forestalled a significant attempt by the ED to
ensure that programs were showing some form of payoff for students. Fortunately,
the ED has taken steps to promulgate new regulations that would pass judicial
review.248
(b) Broadening Misrepresentation
The ED sought to change the definition of misrepresentation in a way that
would encompass any statement pertaining to an institution, rather than only those
pertaining to an educational program, its financial charges, the employability of
graduates, and a fourth topic that the ED added—“[the] institution’s relationship
with [ED].”249 Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, the revision was deemed overly
broad, encompassing misrepresentations not covered by the HEA.250 Similarly, the
ED sought to broaden the definition of misrepresentation to encompass confusing
statements,251 such as per term tuition quotes. Once again, a court held that the
change “exceed[ed] the HEA’s limits”252 and raised First Amendment concerns.253
(c) Eliminating Safe Harbors
The ED’s decision to eliminate the incentive compensation safe harbors was
mostly upheld. Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, a court requested clarifications
regarding two issues prompted by the eliminations, but stopped short of halting their
imposition.254 The court also upheld the ED’s requirement that states establish a
complaint grievance process as part of their responsibility to authorize schools

247

Id. (“[T]he tests are obviously ‘intertwined’—and so the court cannot sever one from
the others.”).
248
Public Hearings, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,467 (Apr. 16, 2013) (announcing the intent to
inform a negotiated rulemaking committee that will attempt to draft new gainful employment
regulations).
249
Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 451 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
250
Id.
251
See id. at 434.
252
Id. at 449–54.
253
Id. at 453; see also id. at 454–57 (affirming the constitutionality of the ED’s
proscription of misrepresentations made in the form of commercial speech).
254
One of the eliminated safe harbors allowed admissions officers to be paid based on
the number of students who completed their educational programs or who were successfully
retained beyond the first academic year of enrollment. Id. at 438. The court found the ED’s
justification for its elimination lacking. Id. at 448. The court was also dissatisfied with the
ED’s response to a question regarding the effect of the elimination on diversity outreach. Id.
at 448–49. Without better explanations, the ED’s elimination of the safe harbors would be
“arbitrary and capricious.” Id. However, the court did not foresee the ED having a difficult
time meeting the burden of explanation. Id.
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within their borders.255 There is some reason for optimism regarding the extent to
which these new regulations will remove some, though not all, incentives to
recruitment deception.
Irrespective of attempts at improving the effectiveness of the triad, the
regulatory system provides few disincentives to unscrupulous behavior in the
admissions process and virtually no paths to redress for victims of this behavior.
And, unfortunately, when victims bring lawsuits, they find that courtroom relief is
fleeting as well.
B. False Claims Act
As mentioned earlier, the federal False Claims Act256 allows private individuals
with personal knowledge of fraud against the federal government to bring suit
against alleged defrauders in the name of the government. The purpose of the Act is
to incentivize whistleblowing by allowing whistleblowers to share in any monetary
recovery they secure.257 Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and a handful
of municipalities have similar statutes on the books, though many of these laws are
applicable only to Medicaid fraud.258
Individuals bringing false claims suits against educational institutions have had
some success winning monetary recoveries.259 Most notably, the University of
Phoenix agreed to pay the federal government $67.5 million to settle a false claims
case alleging violations very similar to those made in United States v. Education
Management Corp.260 The whistleblowers in that case received $19 million for their
efforts.261
But while the False Claims Act seems to provide potent deterrents to fraudulent
behavior by schools, they still represent a relatively novel way of disincentivizing
this behavior. In the last fourteen years, less than fifty of these cases have been filed
in federal court.262 But more significantly, false claims statutes do little to empower
the nongovernmental, private victims of fraudulent behavior. When a monetary
recovery is secured, it is the defrauded governmental entity and the individuals
255

Id. at 460 (citing the ED’s concern about “the historical lack of state oversight”); see
also id. at 462–63 (vacating new requirements for state authorization on online programs,
due to the ED’s failure to follow rulemaking procedure).
256
31 U.S.C. §§3729–3733 (2012).
257
Id. at § 3730(d)(1) (allowing for award to qui tam plaintiff for 15–25% of the
proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim).
258
States with False Claims Acts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND,
http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts, archived at http://perma.cc/95GW-D9WM (last
visited Sept. 7, 2014).
259
See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 13 (providing a list of false claims cases filed since
1999).
260
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, University of Phoenix Settles False Claims Act
Lawsuit for $67.5 Million (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009
/December/09-civ-1345.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MX9A-MMDL.
261
Id.
262
See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 13.

2015]

TORT LIABILITY FOR RECRUITMENT DECEPTION

461

bringing the case (who in many cases aided the fraud) who benefit. Private victims
do not share in that windfall.
C. Contract Law
Students have a contractual relationship with their higher education
institutions.263 Promises made by school officials and rights and responsibilities
embodied in school policies can form the basis of the legal relationship264 if they are
sufficiently specific.265 If an admissions officer promises a prospective student a
particular educational outcome (e.g., employment upon graduation), and in reliance
upon that promise the student enrolls, the student would have a viable breach of
contract claim if the promise is unfulfilled.
The viability of a breach of contract action turns on an alleged promise’s
specificity. If the student can “point to an identifiable contractual promise that the
defendant failed to honor,” her claim will be heard on the merits and possibly be
successful.266 Claims based on promises that are less than “reasonably certain”
would likely be dismissed for failing to “provide a basis for determining the
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.”267 Allegations about
program quality are typically not actionable in a breach of contract suit,268 even
though admissions officers often base their pitch on quality-based assertions.
This judicial posture leaves much room for unscrupulous admissions officers
to operate. Vague assurances do not carry the same legal consequences, even though
they can have the same inducing effect on the prospective student. Similarly, claims
based on puffery are likely to be dismissed.269
Contract law assumes arms-length parties; therefore, there is typically no duty
to disclose between parties. However, courts have found such a duty in several types
of instances, including when the disclosure is required by law, regulation, or
longstanding precedent; when a party intentionally conceals information; when a
party makes a partial, but not complete, disclosure; when a party makes a statement
263

See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. (“The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institution made
available to the matriculant become a part of the contract.” (quoting Zumbrun v. Univ. of S.
Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Ct. App. 1972))).
265
Key v. Coryell, 185 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the terms of
a student handbook “were so vague and general that they are not enforceable”).
266
Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.
267
Key, 185 S.W.3d at 103.
268
Ross, 957 F.2d at 416–17 (“To state a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must
do more than simply allege that the education was not good enough.”).
269
For example, if an admissions officer promises that their school provides extensive
career assistance to students, a plaintiff alleging that the services fell short of the promise
would have to identify specific services that the school promised but completely failed to
provide. Allegations of inadequate quality are typically not actionable. The result is that an
admissions officer can extol with impunity nonexistent virtues to prospective students, as
long as her assertions remain just vague enough to avoid legal responsibility. See, e.g., id. at
417.
264
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that she later finds out is untrue; and when there is a fiduciary or confidential
relationship between the parties.270
Some of these exceptions could form the theoretical basis of a contract claim
by a victim of recruitment deception. However, the judicial precedent in this area is
abundantly inconsistent, rendering it very difficult to assess when a duty of
disclosure exists.271 And when the defendant is an educational institution, courts do
not appear to be amenable to departing from the general rule.
D. Tort Law
The common tort theories—fraudulent misrepresentation and two negligence
actions: negligent misrepresentation and educational malpractice—fail to provide
much of a path to relief for victims of recruitment deception.
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In order to successfully claim fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must
prove, at minimum, that the defendant knowingly made a false or baseless
representation regarding a material fact, on which the plaintiff reasonably relied to
his detriment.272 Proving scienter—or intent to deceive—is difficult.273 Savvy
deceivers rarely document their nefarious actions in ways that are amenable to legal
liability. In addition, allegations of fraud must be alleged with a level of specificity
that is often difficult to present.274 Lastly, because opinions and puffery typically
cannot form the basis of a misrepresentation claim,275 a plaintiff is unlikely to prove
fraudulent misrepresentation based on the type of vague assurances often used by
admissions officers to induce enrollment.

270

JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI

AND

PERILLO

ON

CONTRACTS 348–52 (5th ed.

2003).
271

Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the
Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2005) (“Courts
repeatedly reach divergent results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases and have
failed to articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when they will impose a duty
of candor on contracting parties.”).
272
See, e.g., Brug v. Enstar Grp., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Del. 1991) (listing
elements of fraud).
273
Hunter v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 439 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. 1982).
274
See, e.g., Jamieson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctr., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157–58 (D.
Kan. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege the content, time, place, or
maker of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations).
275
See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954) (asserting that an opinion
can become actionable as deceit only if “[d]efendant held himself out as an expert, plaintiffs
hired him to supply information concerning matters of which they were ignorant, and his
unequivocal statement necessarily implied that he knew facts that justified his statement”).
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Reasonable reliance can be difficult to prove in the higher education context
due to the availability of relevant information.276 The ED publishes various types of
data about institutions that collect federal financial aid funds and accrediting
agencies and other entities also publish relevant data.277 This information can be
relevant to the enrollment decision, but the information is underutilized, largely due
to lack of awareness of its existence and lack of insight about how to interpret it.278
This information is unlikely to be helpful to many of the students who for-profit
schools target; but its availability could nonetheless weaken a claim of reasonable
reliance.
2. Negligence
Causes of action based in negligence often fail due to the reluctance of courts
to impose a duty of care upon educational institutions. This reluctance forestalls
most claims where a plaintiff alleges that his school is liable for his not attaining a
certain educational outcome, such as employment upon graduation.279 The following
illustrates one of the primary reasons courts have declined to impose this duty:
Since education is a collaborative and subjective process whose
success is largely reliant on the student, and since the existence of such
outside factors as a student’s attitude and abilities render it impossible to
establish any quality or curriculum deficiencies as a proximate cause to
any injuries, we rule that there is no workable standard of care here and
defendant would face an undue burden if forced to litigate its selection of
curriculum and teaching methods.280

276

See, e.g., Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 956 N.Y.S.2d 54, 60 (App. Div. 2012)
(holding that plaintiffs failed to act as reasonable consumers in not considering data other
than that which was presented by the law school).
277
For example, in the realm of legal education, the American Bar Association (ABA)
and the Law School Admission Council jointly host a searchable database featuring data
about every ABA accredited law school in the country. Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law
Schools: State Map, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, https://officialguide.lsac.org/Release
/Maps/Maps.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6RKF-WMXB (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
278
BRIDGET TERRY LONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & HAMILTON PROJECT, GRADING
HIGHER EDUCATION: GIVING CONSUMERS THE INFORMATION THEY NEED 1 (2010),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/12/higher%20ed
%20long/12_higher_ed_long.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5ENN-Z7VL (“[T]he process
of college choice involves simultaneously ranking options in multiple ways, relying on
incomplete and uncertain information, and receiving little or no support for interpreting the
facts that are available.”).
279
See, e.g., Jamieson, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (“An inability to obtain suitable
employment is not necessarily the result of poor education . . . . [E]fforts of an educational
institution only go so far to ensure the success of its students.” (citing Finstad v. Washburn
Univ. of Topeka, 845 P.2d 685, 692 (Kan. 1993))).
280
Tolman v. CenCor Career Colls., Inc., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992).
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Therefore, if an admissions officer induces a prospective student to enroll based
on puffery about the quality or career and financial benefits of an academic program,
a negligence claim could succeed only if the representations took the form of a
guarantee. Any assertion short of that would be protected from legal liability by the
“collaborative and subjective” nature of education and its outcomes.
The absence of a duty of care is not the only reason why negligent
misrepresentation and educational malpractice claims tend to fail. Negligent
misrepresentation claims suffer from essentially the same issues as those brought in
fraud,281 including the nonactionable nature of opinions and puffery and the effect
of available information on the reasonableness of reliance. In addition, a host of
espoused public policy reasons prevent educational malpractice claims from
surviving dismissal. Reasons include the “inherent uncertainties” in determining
causation and damages, the potential flood of litigation that could overburden
schools, and the traditional deference afforded schools to carry out their internal
operations.282
VI. CONCEPTUALIZED TORT
The inadequacies of the regulatory framework and the inequities of judicial
treatment necessitate new approaches to protecting students from higher education
recruitment deception. Other articles have proposed new administrative and
regulatory frameworks283 and new ways of conceptualizing contract law,284 but there
is a dearth of discussion relating to tort law. This Article seeks to fill that void by
conceptualizing a negligence theory that would protect students and disincentivize
unscrupulous behavior in higher education admissions and recruitment.
The theory, negligent educational recruitment, is an extension of negligent
misrepresentation and, semantically, is based on the tort of information negligently
supplied for the guidance of others.285 Negligent educational recruitment is premised
281

The fundamental difference between fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent
misrepresentation is that the former requires intent to deceive or utter a baseless statement
while the latter requires no intent, but requires a duty to communicate accurate information.
The intent requirement is essentially replaced by the duty of care.
282
See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414–15 (7th Cir. 1992).
283
See, e.g., Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and
Taxpayers Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 729, 770 (2010).
284
See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University’s Implied
Obligations of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183, 184–85 (2000) (“[T]he
implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing[] hold the potential to define and to police
the student-university relationship while avoiding the pitfalls of judicially second-guessing
and intruding into the management of the institution or into its academic freedoms.”).
285
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Information negligently supplied
for the guidance of others does not require privity between the individual who provides the
false information and those who receive it. But given that courts in some states have resisted
the liberalization of privity requirements in negligence cases, I will argue that privity
nonetheless exists between admissions officers and prospective students in the negligent
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on the view that the core function of an admissions officer is that of counselor, and,
therefore, the use of certain sales tactics and deception invokes potential legal
liability. Lastly, even though this discussion centers on admissions officers, the tort
would potentially apply to any employee or contractor hired by an educational
institution to recruit or enroll students. Financial aid officers and even athletic team
coaches would be examples.
The fundamental purpose of torts is to “deter socially unreasonable conduct.”286
The determent is actualized by requiring tortfeasors to compensate victims of the
tortfeasor’s wrongdoings, thereby increasing the costs of tortious behavior.287 This
understanding of tort law aligns with the corrective justice theory, which is based on
the following premise: “[A]s a matter of individual justice between the plaintiff and
the defendant, the defendant who has caused an injury to the plaintiff in violation of
his rights in his person or property must compensate him for such injury . . . .”288
In essence, a fair and effective system of corrective justice can be boiled down
to three elements: (1) the consistent assignment of liability that is aligned with
“moral norms of responsibility”; (2) the just compensation of victims of tortious
behavior; and (3) an “internal” system of finance where the costs of compensation
are borne by tortfeasors.289 The theory offered in this Part aligns liability for
recruitment deception with norms underlying fairness, and seeks just compensation
of victims of this deception by the institutions that perpetrate it.
A. Negligent Educational Recruitment
Negligent conduct is that “which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others.”290 Negligence is an expansive concept that
encompasses a wide range of human endeavors,291 including the provision of
information to others. The tort of negligent misrepresentation imposes a duty upon
professional suppliers of information to communicate that information accurately.
The following quote explains the premise:

educational recruitment context. See, e.g., Ann T. Hester & James D. Ferrucci, The Architect
as a Source of Salvage (Sept. 30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.forcon.com/userfiles/file/nesfcc/2004/02b.Ferrucci.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/DR2S-NGR4.
286
Cohen, supra note 7, at 1307.
287
Id. at 1326 (“[T]ort damages provide both specific and general deterrence by
motivating injurers to incorporate the cost of consequential losses into their behavioral
decisions.”).
288
Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435 (1985).
289
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439, 450 (1990).
290
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1977).
291
Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Iowa 2001) (“[A]
cause of action for negligence may find support in most any conduct.”).
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[A] person in the profession of supplying information for the guidance of
others acts in an advisory capacity and is manifestly aware of the use that
the information will be put, and intends to supply it for that purpose. Such
a person is also in a position to weigh the use for the information against
the magnitude and probability of the loss that might attend the use of the
information if it is incorrect.292
The conceptualized tort—negligent educational recruitment—is based heavily
on the wording of the tort of information negligently supplied for the guidance of
others, a form of negligent misrepresentation, which dictates:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.293
Information negligently supplied for the guidance of others has four essential
elements: (1) the communication of false or inaccurate information, (2) by a person
who is paid to supply information, (3) upon which the hearer of the information
justifiably relies, (4) to her financial detriment. In a nutshell, the tort protects hearers
(in this case, third parties) of false or inaccurate representations made by people who
should know what they are talking about. These elements align with the three basic
elements of negligence: duty, breach, and causation. The duty arises out of the
tortfeasor’s pecuniary interest in providing information. The breach occurs when the
tortfeasor communicates false information she should have known was false. And
the reasonable, detrimental reliance accounts for the causation.
1. Duty of Care
The nature of the relationship between parties determines the existence of a
duty of care. Such duty is commonly found when created by contract, “where there
is a relationship of ‘peculiar trust and confidence,’” or when a relationship is typified
by asymmetrical bargaining power or access to information.294 A “special
relationship” is formed through these interactions, from which the duty arises. The
nature of the relationship between admissions officers and prospective students is
indeed “special” in that it is very often based on peculiar trust and confidence and is
typified by unequal bargaining power and access to information.
292

Id. at 124–25 (citations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
294
Ellen Byers, Addressing the Consumer’s Worst Nightmare: Toward a More
Expansive Development of the Law of Tortious Fraud and Deceptive Practices in Kansas,
38 WASHBURN L.J. 455, 469 (1999) (citing Lindholm v. Nelson, 264 P. 50, 50 (Kan. 1928)).
293
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The provision of information is one of the major functions of an admissions
officer. Each of the announcements described earlier placed an onus on the officer
to be a source of information about program content and requirements, as well as
the admissions process. Put differently, admissions officers are paid to provide
information. Numerous courts have held that a pecuniary interest in providing
information solidifies the special nature of a commercial relationship.295 In the
education context, one court held that a high school counselor was “in the profession
of supplying information to others” and, therefore, reasoned that the counselor had
a duty to communicate accurate information to students.296
In addition to relying on admissions officers for information, prospective
students disclose personal information to these individuals. The scope of the
information is broad, encompassing past and present experiences and future
aspirations. The information is sometimes closely held by the applicant, making
disclosure to the admissions officer even more significant. It is not uncommon for a
prospective student to disclose how a difficult, if not painful, life experience
motivates her to pursue the educational endeavor for which she is applying. Some
disclosures are required; others are motivated by the perception that the admissions
officer is a counselor serving the applicant’s best interests. Because of their
significance, the disclosures are typically protected by institutional privacy
policies.297 Therefore, the relationship between admissions counselor and
prospective student is clearly peculiar in the extent to which prospects place their
trust and confidence in admissions officers.298
The relationship is also often typified by unequal access to information and
unequal bargaining power. Various forms of institutional information are publicly
available, though it is underutilized and often inscrutable to many applicants. But in
spite of this access, admissions officers nonetheless maintain information
advantages that give them the ability to exercise undue influence. An example is
how admissions officers can exaggerate the scarcity of space in an entering class,
knowing that prospective students have no means of verification. The bargaining
disparity is made worse by the sales training that some admissions officers receive,
295

See, e.g., Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 126.
Id.
297
See, e.g., BLOOMFIELD COLL., UNDERGRADUATE APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION 5,
available at http://www.bloomfield.edu/sites/default/files/common/Undergraduate_Degree
_Application.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5LC3-JEDG (“Bloomfield College’s policy is
to protect the privacy of applicants.”); LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., LSAC
STATEMENT OF GOOD ADMISSION AND FINANCIAL AID PRACTICES—JD PROGRAMS 3 (2014),
available at http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/publications-(lsac-resources)/state
mentofgoodadm.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TT8P-7EXS (recommending that law
schools “be scrupulous in maintaining the privacy of applicants”).
298
See, e.g., Lewis v. Rosenfeld, 138 F. Supp. 2d 466, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A]
commercial relationship may become a ‘special relationship’ where ‘the parties . . . enjoy a
relationship of trust and reliance closer . . . than that of the ordinary buyer and seller.’”)
(quoting Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., No. 87 CIV. 3297 (JMW), 1988 WL 96586,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1988)).
296
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which is intensified through excessive contact. This dynamic allows for advantage
taking by unscrupulous admissions officers whose predominant focus is closing the
deal. And while such a result may be acceptable on a car lot, the stakes involved in
the higher education context justifies imposing a duty of care.
2. Breach
Behavior is deemed tortious by legislative or judicial action. Both methods of
deeming are typically the result of “social and moral requirements” that arise.299
Thus, behaviors that once carried no potential for legal liability are now considered
tortious based on shifting societal norms.300 Judicial deeming serves as a flexible gap
filler in the absence of relevant legislative action. Judges see unaddressed legal
harms and fashion common law remedies.301 But irrespective of the method, societal
norms necessitate that certain behaviors be deemed tortious within the context of
higher education admissions.
As argued earlier, contemporary pressures put admissions officers in the
conflicting posture of having to serve as counselors while having to sell a product.
But given the wide-ranging stakes involved in a prospective student’s decision to
pursue higher education,302 admissions officers must fully embrace their counseling
responsibility, to the exclusion of their sales role. Therefore, many behaviors
endemic to sales culture should be considered tortious in the higher education
context.
The general rule in misrepresentation cases is that “a person cannot
misrepresent his own opinion”; therefore, only factual assertions are typically
actionable.303 Some courts, however, have deemed opinions actionable when they
are “‘not a causal expression of belief’ but a ‘deliberate affirmation of the matters
stated.’”304 The negligent educational recruitment tort would embrace this approach.
The communication of not only false statements, but also opinions, puffery, or
forward-looking statements would be considered potentially tortious. Doing so
would attach legal responsibility to the baseless, but legally vague assurances that
admissions officers often use to induce enrollment. Officers would think twice
299

Cohen, supra note 7, at 1292.
See, e.g., Seth E. Lipner & Lisa A. Catalano, The Tort of Giving Negligent
Investment Advice, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 663, 668 (2009) (documenting the advent of the tort
of negligent investment advice in response to the increased prominence of the investment
industry).
301
Cohen, supra note 7, at 1292 (“[T]he creation of affirmative duties may reflect ad
hoc moral judgments about what behavior warrants punishment even though it is
unaddressed in the law.”).
302
Stakes relate to actual and opportunity costs, chances of completion, chances of
employment, and ability to repay student loans. Some of these stakes are personal to the
prospective student, but many of them have broader relevance.
303
Darst v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 716 N.E.2d 579, 584 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
304
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Gagne v.
Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954) (en banc)).
300
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before assuring an applicant that he would have “no problem” achieving a certain
outcome if such an assertion came with potential legal consequences.
The Senate investigation found that for-profit schools also employ elaborate
tactics and procedures for dealing with reluctance or hesitance.305 The danger of
these tactics is that the applicant’s best interests are irrelevant. Therefore, finding
(and poking) the pain, inundating skeptical prospective students with contact,
exaggerating the scarcity of space in the entering class, and other hard-sell tactics
should be considered tortious. In fact, in situations where a prospect has expressed
a desire to no longer be considered for enrollment, any further contact should be
considered tortious. Such limitations already exist in the higher education context.
The NCAA restricts the amount of contact school representatives can have with
prospective athletes. In addition to being subject to a broad definition of “contact,”306
these individuals are subject to an elaborate scheme of restrictions “designed in part
to protect prospective student-athletes from undue pressures that may interfere with
their scholastic or athletics interest.”307
Such restrictions exist in other realms as well. The American Bar Association
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid lawyers from soliciting
prospective clients after they have “made known to the lawyer a desire not to be
solicited.”308 The rule applies not only to situations where the prospect expressly
makes her desire known, but also to situations where the client is unresponsive to
the lawyer’s outreach.309 Therefore, a lawyer who continues to contact a prospective
client, even after receiving no response to earlier attempts, is potentially in violation
of the ban.
The rule is intended to safeguard against the risk of abuse inherent in these
interactions. The asymmetric dynamic in the prospective attorney-client relationship
is similar to the dynamic in the prospective admissions officer-student relationship.
And the following recitation of the rule’s premise could easily be applied to the
higher education setting:
The person . . . may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available
alternatives [for legal services] with reasoned judgment and appropriate
self-interest in the face of the lawyer’s presence and insistence upon being
retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue
influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.310
305

See HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 63.
The NCAA defines contact as: “[A]ny face-to-face encounter between a prospective
student-athlete or the prospective student-athlete’s parents, relatives or legal guardians and
an institutional staff member or athletics representative during which any dialogue occurs in
excess of an exchange of a greeting.” NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2012–13 NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL § 13.02.4, at 77 (2012), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D113.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P493-UUNK.
307
Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2004).
308
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)(1) (2013).
309
Id. at cmt. 6.
310
Id. at cmt. 2.
306
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Hard-sell tactics place students at risk in much of the same way they place legal
clients at risk. Therefore, deeming these tactics to be tortious in the higher education
context would prompt admissions officers to embrace their counselor role in a
manner that would better serve students and taxpayers. In alleging that tortious
behavior has occurred, plaintiffs could provide documented evidence, such as
telephone records and emails, as well as recitations of conversations. Admissions
training manuals, misleading commercials and marketing materials, internal emails,
and other institutional documents could be used to bolster allegations as well.
The level of detail required in pleadings is important because it greatly
influences the odds of a plaintiff’s case surviving dismissal. In pleading breach under
the negligent educational recruitment theory, plaintiffs would be required to provide
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [they are] entitled to relief.”311
This pleading standard stops short of the more stringent “with particularity” standard
that is applied in intentional misrepresentation cases and even some negligent
misrepresentation cases.312 The purpose of imposing the lower standard is to protect
students by broadening paths to redress.
3. Causation
The causation analysis is framed around the question, “Did the tortious aspect
of the defendant’s conduct contribute to an injury to the plaintiff’s person or
property?”313 This analysis is “backward-looking, individualized, and factual.”314
The empirical nature of causation315 can make it difficult to determine, especially
when there are many potential causes.316 This point is particularly salient in the
311
See, e.g., Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824,
838–39 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation,
plaintiff “must set forth ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff]
is entitled to relief’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8)).
312
There is a split among the judicial circuits regarding the level of detail required for
plaintiffs to plead negligent misrepresentation. For example, the Seventh Circuit imposes the
lower “short and plain statement” requirement while the Eighth Circuit requires plaintiffs to
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Compare id., with
Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A]ny allegation of
misrepresentation, whether labeled as a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or negligent
misrepresentation, is considered an allegation of fraud which must be pled with
particularity.”).
313
Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics,
and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001,
1004 (1988) [hereinafter Wright, Bramble Bush].
314
Wright, supra note 288, at 437.
315
Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to
Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 285, 286 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
316
See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Yuval Sinai, Liability Under Uncertain Causation?
Four Talmudic Answers to a Contemporary Tort Dilemma, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 449, 453
(2012).
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education context. As courts have noted, education is a collaborative process, with
outcomes being influenced by a range of factors related and unrelated to the actual
education received. The nature of the process makes determining causation difficult
and serves as a justification for the narrow paths to redress discussed earlier.
In creating a tort path, a test of causation must be identified that accounts for
causal uncertainty in a manner that serves the fundamental purpose of discouraging
socially unreasonable behavior. The necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS)
test of causation best serves this purpose. NESS is based on the following premise:
“[A] particular condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was
a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for
the occurrence of the consequence.”317
Therefore, pursuant to NESS, causation would be proven if a plaintiff could
show that an admissions officer’s tortious conduct (a particular condition) was a
cause of the plaintiff incurring expenses in an educational program in which he
experienced an unfavorable outcome (specific consequence), because the plaintiff
would not have enrolled in the program but for the tortious conduct (necessary
element). It is immaterial that other factors, such as family circumstances or lack of
ability, also could have contributed to the undesirable outcome. Causation is proven
as long as the admissions officer’s tortious conduct was a “necessary element”
among the “set of antecedent actual conditions” that led to the “specific
consequence” of the undesirable outcome. If the plaintiff would have enrolled in the
program anyway, even in the absence of any tortious conduct, then no causation
would be found.318
A plaintiff’s reliance on the tortious conduct must be reasonable in order for
causation to be found. In the financial advising context, where the tort of information
negligently supplied for the guidance of others has been deemed actionable, the
“sophistication of [the] plaintiff[], the existence of disclaimers, and a defendant’s
possession of unique or special expertise” are relevant to the reasonableness
assessment.319 Sophisticated investors are held to a higher standard of
317

Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1774 (1985)
[hereinafter Wright, Causation in Tort Law]. NESS is described as “a test of weak necessity
or strong sufficiency . . . .” Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 313, at 1020. In determining
causation, such tests require that a condition be a necessary element of a set of actual or
existing conditions necessary for the occurrence of the consequence. Id. In contrast, strict
necessity tests require that the condition be necessary for the occurrence of the consequence,
each time it occurs. Id. The most common tests of necessity are based on a strong-necessity
premise that requires the condition be necessary for the occurrence of the consequence on
that particular occasion. Id. at 1021. The but-for test is a strong-necessity test. Id. In terms of
sufficiency, weak-sufficiency tests require only that a condition be a part of some set of
existing conditions that was sufficient to cause the consequence. Id. at 1020.
318
Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 313, at 1041 (explaining that the “obvious . . .
way” to determine causation using NESS is to eliminate the tortious conduct from the set of
conditions and surmise whether the specific consequence would have nonetheless occurred).
319
King Cnty. Washington v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288,
312 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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reasonableness pursuant to an “enhanced duty to obtain material information.”320
Similar standards have been applied in the educational context.
In dismissing misrepresentation claims against New York Law School (NYLS),
one court characterized prospective law students as “a sophisticated subset of
education consumers, capable of sifting through data and weighing alternatives
before making a decision regarding their post-college options.”321 The court opined
further, “In these new and troubling times, the reasonable consumer of legal
education must realize that . . . omnipresent realities . . . obviously trump any
allegedly overly optimistic claims in their law school’s marketing materials.”322
Because “[m]easuring reasonableness is done in the context of circumstances,”323
the court’s conclusion could have been different had the plaintiffs been for-profit
school dropouts, instead of law school graduates.
In applying these dictates to the tort of negligent educational recruitment, courts
could consider a range of factors. One such factor is the type and extent of the
tortious behavior. Exposure to a range of different or particularly sharp tactics could
bolster a plaintiff’s case. In addition, the plaintiff’s insight into higher education
could be considered. Put differently, was it reasonable for the plaintiff to be
influenced by the tortious conduct? A plaintiff with no higher education experience
when exposed to the tortious conduct would have a stronger case than a plaintiff
who already possessed a degree. A plaintiff who was a first-generation college
student would have a relatively strong case as well. In addition, the institutional role
of the person making the negligent representation would be important, as it is more
reasonable to rely on the representations of, say, an admissions dean than it is a
student recruiter.
Length of enrollment in the program could be a factor as well, and indeed an
effective limiting principle, with shorter periods of enrollment bolstering the
plaintiff’s case. A plaintiff who dropped out during his initial enrollment period
would have a stronger argument for causation than a plaintiff who also enrolled in
subsequent periods. Similarly, the length of time between the plaintiff’s exposure to
the tortious behavior and the plaintiff’s enrollment would be relevant. A plaintiff
who enrolled immediately after (or during) exposure would have a stronger case
than a plaintiff who enrolled later.
The availability of institutional information would be relevant, but plaintiffs
would be allowed to rely on the representations of admissions officers regarding
matters that are “peculiarly within [the officers’] knowledge,” without conducting
investigations of their own.324 For example, students should not have to verify
completion or employment data provided by admissions counselors. This allowance
320

Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Tech., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 41, 57 (E.D.N.Y.

2011).
321
Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 843–44 (Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d,
956 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 2012).
322
Id. at 851.
323
Id. at 853.
324
Maverick Fund, L.D.C., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co.,
615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1980)) (applying this standard in the investment context).
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is, once again, premised on the view that admissions officers must completely
embrace their counseling responsibilities, especially in dealings with disadvantaged
or vulnerable populations.
NESS is a derivative of the seminal but-for test of causation.325 But implicit in
NESS is an appreciation of the complex nature of the human existence326 and a desire
to discourage tortious behavior, even if the behavior was not the sole or predominant
cause of an injury.327 NESS prevents tortious actors who cause, or contribute to,
harm from using other potential causes to shield themselves from legal liability.
Such shielding not only leads to irrational outcomes,328 but also encourages tortious
behavior by allowing it to go unpunished. Applying NESS to recruitment deception
would increase the chances that schools would be held accountable for tortious
behavior and, as a result, incidences of deception would likely decrease.
B. Damages
In the context of tort law, a corrective system of justice requires that victims of
tortious injuries be restored to their “pre-injury position” through compensation
from the tortfeasor.329 Put simply, “if A appropriates X from B, corrective justice
325
The but-for test dictates that: “an act (omission, condition, etc.) was a cause of an
injury if an only if, but for the act, the injury would not have occurred. That is, the act must
have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of the injury.” Wright, Causation in Tort
Law, supra note 317, at 1775; see also id. at 1802–03 (explaining that when there is only one
tortious cause of the injury, NESS test becomes a but-for test).
326
Id. at 1823–24 (“It is unnecessary, even if it were possible, to explain a particular
occurrence by detailing all the antecedent conditions . . . . As the precision and detail of the
description of all the antecedent conditions increases, our ability to predict the effect
improves. Beyond a certain point, however, the explanatory force of the description does not
improve, but rather lessens as it increasingly becomes a description of a unique event rather
than an instance of some broad generalization . . . .”).
327
See Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 313, at 1037. “[A] condition can be a cause
under the NESS test . . . even if it was neither necessary nor independently sufficient” to
cause the specific injury. Id. at 1035.
328
A weakness of the but-for test is that it often results in scenarios where no causation
is found even though a particular tortious act was a cause of a specific injury. See Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, supra note 317, at 1775. Two types of scenarios are termed
preemptive causation and duplicative causation. Id. An example of preemptive causation is
if D shoots and kills P just as P was about to drink a cup of tea poisoned by C. Id. D would
not be liable for P’s death because P would have died from the poisoned tea in the absence
of D’s act. Id. The but-for test assigns causation “if and only if” the injury (death, in this
case) would not have occurred “but for” the tortious act. In duplicative causation scenarios,
if C and D independently start separate fires, each sufficient to destroy P’s house, and the
fires converge together and burn down the house, neither C nor D would be held liable
because the other’s fire could have destroyed the house. Id. at 1775–76. Duplicative
causation scenarios are particularly relevant to the educational context where many factors
are potential causes of a bad outcome.
329
John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1027, 1033 (2003).
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requires that he return or replace that commodity X.”330 Therefore, a means of
determining damages in financial terms is essential.
The intangible and collaborative nature of the educational process makes
computing damages difficult. How do you determine the financial harm done to a
student who enrolled based on an admissions officer’s tortious deception, and who
had access to courses but failed to complete the program? What if the student earns
the credential, but finds that the market demand for it is much less robust than the
admissions officer tortiously represented? On one end, the current practice of
foreclosing recovery results in the complete undercompensation of plaintiffs. But on
the other end, full reimbursement of expenses would likely amount to
overcompensation.331 Short of absolute deprivation, it is difficult to determine in
financial terms the difference between the educational experience promised and the
educational experience obtained. But difficulty should not be confused with
impossibility, and the prospect of imprecision should not be allowed to leave victims
without paths to redressing their harms.
1. Determining Education Value
In order to determine damages caused by negligent educational recruitment, a
value would be assigned to the education that the victim actually received. Courts
have been reluctant to engage in this exercise. In dismissing the suit against NYLS,
the court stated the following:
“[P]laintiff’s theory of damages, that is, an award of the difference
between what they paid for their law degree and an amount representing
its ostensibly lesser intrinsic worth . . . is entirely too speculative and
remote to be quantified as a remedy under the law.”332
This reluctance fits the theme of hostility many courts have shown when asked
to consider the actual value of education. But the hostility is largely misplaced. The
lack of absolute certainty is not an automatic bar to an award of damages. Courts
often award damages based on assumptions and valuations that are less than
concrete.333
330

Id. at 1070.
Even in incidences where students are induced to enroll based on tortious conduct,
the student nonetheless had access to the educational product and has potentially benefited
from that exposure. Complete reimbursement would seem appropriate only in instances of
complete failure to deliver the educational product.
332
Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d,
956 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 2012).
333
See, e.g., Patrick G. Dunleavy, When Are Lost Profits Calculations Considered
Speculative? An Expert’s Perspective, FED. BAR ASS’N NEWSLETTER, Spring 2006, at 5, 5–
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The plaintiffs suing NYLS sought “restitution and disgorgement of all tuition
monies remitted to NYLS.”334 But given that the plaintiffs left NYLS with a
credential that allowed each of them to qualify for bar admission,335 such a prayer
for relief is excessive. A better theory of damages would have acknowledged that
the education the plaintiffs received had some value, even if less than what was
promised. In a compensatory system of justice, overcompensation is no better than
undercompensation.
So in order to ensure that plaintiffs are compensated for damages arising from
negligent educational recruitment, a proxy for educational value needs to be
identified. The most useful proxy would be the least expensive tuition rate among a
pool of comparable programs. Any tuition (and fees) paid above this baseline would
represent the plaintiff’s damages.
The tuition charged by schools is the result of a range of strategic
considerations. Schools consider their own costs, student demand, as well as tuition
charged by competitor schools. Therefore, tuition rates, by their very nature, are
measures of market value in much of the same way as automobile sticker prices.
Additionally, it is safe to assume that most students seek out educational value—the
best education possible for the lowest price possible—when choosing among
programs. Therefore, using the lowest price among a pool of comparable programs
serves as a useful, though admittedly imperfect, proxy for educational value.
Price differences among comparable programs can be very significant,
especially when for-profit schools are compared to public institutions. The Senate
investigation found the following examples:
The Medical Assistant diploma program at Corinthian’s Heald College in
Fresno, CA, costs $22,275. A comparable program at Fresno City College
costs $1,650. An Associate degree in paralegal studies at CorinthianOwned Everest College in Ontario, CA, costs $41,149, compared to
$2,392 for the same degree at Santa Ana College. Everest College charges
$82,280 for a Bachelor’s Degree in Business. The same degree is available
at the University of California – Irvine for $55,880.336
Using the above findings, a student who was induced by tortious behavior to
enroll in Everest’s paralegal associate’s degree program could qualify for up to
$38,757 in damages—the difference between Everest and the presumably lowest
priced Santa Ana College.
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2. Determining Pool of Comparable Programs
A critical aspect of this process would be determining the programs that will
make up the pool from which the proxy will be determined. The composition of the
pool would likely be a topic of contention between the parties, with the trier of fact
making the final determination. The approach to determining the pool of programs
would be different based on the selectivity of the program that is the focus of the
lawsuit. In cases where the plaintiff was place bound and applied to nonselective
programs,337 all comparable nonselective programs within a certain determined
radius (e.g., twenty miles) of the plaintiff’s home would make up the pool, even if
the plaintiff did not apply to all of them. In cases where a plaintiff enrolled in an
online program, all comparable online programs offered within the plaintiff’s state
of residence could make up the pool.
This approach is based on a presumption that place-bound students who attend
nonselective programs could have just as easily attended another, comparable
program in the area. The defendant could rebut this presumption by showing that a
particular program was not a practical option for the plaintiff due to its scheduling
format, course delivery method, or some other issue that would have prevented the
plaintiff from attending. A plaintiff could also attempt to add programs to the pool
by showing that she applied and gained admission. Such efforts could pertain to
adding programs outside of the radius or programs with different course delivery
methods than the one in which the plaintiff enrolled. The focus of all these efforts
would be on the lowest-priced programs. Plaintiffs would seek to lower the proxy
tuition rate, while defendants would seek to raise it.
In cases where a plaintiff enrolled in a selective program, the pool would be
determined based on where the plaintiff applied and gained admission. The basis for
this approach is that a selective program cannot be considered “comparable” if
admission was impossible, either because the plaintiff did not apply or because the
school denied the plaintiff’s admission. For example, for each plaintiff in the NYLS
case, the proxy for the value of the NYLS education would have been the lowest
priced law school to which the plaintiff gained admission.
Once the pool of comparable programs is determined and the lowest priced
proxy is identified, the process of determining damages would entail simply
calculating the difference between the tuition paid at the institution attended from
the tuition at the lowest priced institutions in the pool. Fee differences would be
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added to the total, though books and other expenses would not. Scholarships, grants,
and other financial aid that does not have to be repaid would be subtracted.
C. Concerns
Creating a tort path to financial recovery could fundamentally change the
manner in which many admissions officers approach their work and the manner in
which institutions promote themselves. Put simply, this new path to redress could
change the business of higher education. Such changes would inevitably come with
concerns and potential downsides.
The principal concern relates to the potentially limited extent to which plaintiffs
would be able to retain legal representation. Generally, plaintiffs with the strongest
cases would have dropped out of their programs relatively soon after being induced
to enroll by the tortious conduct. Therefore, the extent of their damages would be
limited. As a result, many lawyers would be reluctant to expend time and energy
taking on these cases without requiring plaintiffs to pay fees upfront.
In order to remedy this concern, the award of attorney’s fees would be very
important. This would incentivize lawyers to take cases on behalf of plaintiffs unable
to pay legal fees—a population arguably most likely to be victimized. Absent a
potential award of attorney’s fees, plaintiffs could bring actions in small claims
court, though the process of gathering evidence may be formidable for many pro se
plaintiffs. Class actions could also make these cases financially worthwhile.
Paradoxically, critics might argue that the proposed tort would prompt
disgruntled students to inundate schools with frivolous cases. This criticism would
be overblown. These cases would not be easy to prove. Plaintiffs would carry
burdens of proving tortious behavior and causation. It stands to reason that given
these evidentiary burdens and relatively small damages, few lawyers would agree to
bring frivolous cases.
Critics might also assert that the scope of tortious behaviors limits the
constitutional rights of schools to promote themselves and their programs. This
criticism would be misplaced, as the proposed torts would only restrict false,
baseless, and misleading assertions and other unscrupulous behavior.
Finally, critics might argue that schools would be reluctant to enroll marginal
or at-risk students out of fear that they would present lawsuit risks. A simple retort
would be that there will always be higher education options for students with
financial aid eligibility. But if the empowering of victims of recruitment deception
prompted schools to consider their programs and services in light of a prospective
student’s needs and goals, or better yet, if schools were prompted to actually adapt
their programs and services to fit those needs and goals, those would be positive
outcomes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Admissions officers are counselors, not used car salespeople. Therefore, the use
of certain sales and recruitment tactics should be considered tortious in the higher
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education context. Providing a path to redress through tort law would disincentivize
these unscrupulous tactics and, in the process, help protect students from a higher
education sucker sale.

